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Introduction 
 
Reducing vehicle miles traveled through increasing the use of public transit 
and improving transit access is critical to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions in California. Housing development properly focused in infill areas with 
transit accessibility (transit-oriented development or “TOD”) may significantly 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions if it increases transit usage and results in reducing 
vehicle miles traveled. Senate Bill 3754 recognizes that meeting GHG reduction 
targets through increased transit use requires the adoption of sustainable, integrated 
regional transportation and community planning strategies to promote TOD. 
But housing costs in the coastal communities of California near major 
regional economic centers and transit are too high for many families. Low-income 
families that cannot afford housing near their work commute ten percent further 
than commuters elsewhere5 which may directly undermine the goals of recent 
legislation intended to address climate change. Research also links high housing 
costs within coastal communities, like the Bay Area, to the resegregation of the 
region,6 a crisis with major implications for public welfare and public health 
outcomes.7 Infill development in transit accessible neighborhoods within these 
coastal communities must therefore occur equitably to avoid the risk of displacing 
low-income populations from these neighborhoods or exacerbating current cost 
barriers to entry for low-income populations into highly desirable neighborhoods 
with substantial transit accessibility or transit investment.8 The goals of reducing 
GHG emissions and equity are thus linked; emissions reductions cannot occur if 
commute times are increasing because low- and middle-income communities are 
pushed to farther rings of the suburbs and forced to drive to access economic 
centers of opportunity. 
Even as California’s state legislature responded in 2017 with the passage and 
signing of housing bills9 meant to address escalating housing costs, legislators and 
 
4. See S.B. 375, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). 
5. CHAS ALAMO, BRIAN UHLER & MARIANNE O’MALLEY, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., 
CALIFORNIA’S HIGH HOUSING COSTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (2015) (“LAO REPORT”). 
6. See Rising Housing Costs and Re-segregation, URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT (Oct. 
26, 2018), https://perma.cc/8N88-F3CV. 
7. For a general discussion of the relationship between racial residential segregation 
and health outcomes, see David R. Williams & Charles O. Collins, Racial Residential 
Segregation: A Fundamental Cause of Racial Disparities in Health, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 
404, 404–16 (2001). For an analysis on the impact of racial residential segregation on life 
outcomes in Oakland, California, see Matt Beyers et al., Life and Death from Unnatural 
Causes: Health and Social Inequity in Alameda County, ALAMEDA CTY. PUB. HEALTH DEP’T 
i, i–142 (2008).  
8. Throughout this article we use the term “equitable infill development” to describe 
TOD or infill development that considers equity through affordability components or other 
mechanisms that would address the risk of displacement of low-income populations or 
exclusion of low-income populations.  
9. Governor Brown Signs Comprehensive Legislative Package to Increase State’s 
Housing Supply and Affordability, OFF. OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (Sep. 29, 
2017), https://perma.cc/6R5X-VHGD. 
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others acknowledged that more is needed to address California’s housing crisis.10 
One recurring theme in the ongoing coverage and discussion of the housing crisis 
is an argument that state-mandated environmental review under the California 
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) is a significant contributor to the housing 
crisis because it adds time and money to the development process, and that given 
the persistent housing crisis, CEQA merits legal reform.11 Others advance that 
local land use regulations significantly constrain housing development12 and have 
proposed legislation to narrow local authority over infill development near 
transit.13  
Existing urban planning and urban economics research correlates the overall 
stringency of a jurisdiction’s land use regulations with high housing costs and 
income segregation.14 But this research, though important, cannot answer the 
question of which specific elements of local land use regulation or state 
environmental review contribute disproportionately to either the cost of housing or 
the exclusion of low-income communities from these metro areas. Despite these 
limitations, the impact of this research and similar work has been far reaching, 
surfacing in statewide policy briefs15 and political debates about proposed 
legislation.16  
 
10. Liam Dillon, Gov. Brown Just Signed 15 Housing Bills. Here’s How They’re 
Supposed to Help the Affordability Crisis, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc 
/9Y9V-C2AX; Angela Hart, Jerry Brown Signs New California Affordable Housing Laws, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Sep. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/9XXU-A4Q2; Liam Dillon, The 
Housing Package Passed by California Lawmakers is the Biggest Thing They’ve Done in 
Years. But it Won’t Lower Your Rent, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/4WL9-
4L6R. 
11. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, How Local Housing Regulations Smother 
the U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/9DBQ-28JF; Liam Dillon, 
Which California Megaprojects Get Breaks from Complying with Environmental Law? 
Sometimes, It Depends on the Project, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y4BS-
FBZQ; Angela Hart, Here’s Why California’s Historic Housing Legislation Won’t Bring 
Down Costs Anytime Soon, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sep. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/P8FT-
8T2P. 
12. See Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 11; THE WHITE HOUSE, HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 
TOOLKIT 2 (Sep. 2016), https://perma.cc/P4YM-LYPK.  
13. See S.B. 827, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Scott Wiener, My Transit 
Density Bill (SB 827): Answering Common Questions and Debunking Misinformation, 
MEDIUM (Jan. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/GN94-NFAK.  
14. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Zoning on Housing 
Affordability 17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8835, 2002); John 
Quigley, Steven Raphael & Larry A. Rosenthal, Measuring Land Use Regulations and Their 
Effects in the Housing Market, in HOUSING MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY 282 (Lincoln Inst. 
of Land and Policy ed., 2009). 
15. See LAO REPORT, supra note 5. 
16. See Letter from Sheryll D. Cashin et al. to Mike McGuire & Jim Beall (Apr. 5, 
2018), https://perma.cc/4DPJ-UCWP (letter from fair housing experts endorsing SB 827 as 
“a major step towards promoting integration and reducing racial residential segregation”); 
Letter from Amanda Eaken et al. to Scott Wiener (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/S84A-
8YTX (endorsing SB-827 as “a key element in achieving California’s climate goals” on 
behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council, Climate Resolve, and Environment 
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Recognizing the limits of existing data sets and past research applicable to 
California, and the importance of the current policy debate, we began a case study 
of land use development within specific cities in California. We undertook this 
study to better understand what specific regulations of land use development in 
California may contribute to the state’s housing crisis by increasing development 
approval timelines.17 We also examined the specific impact of local and state 
mandated processes on all housing development, including affordable housing 
development, supply, and access.  
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I of our article will cover the elements 
of land use law we identify as having the closest relationship to the ongoing policy 
reform debate, and then will explain the findings and limitations of existing 
research in relationship to current California policy reform proposals. Part II of this 
article provides details about our methods and research approach to respond to this 
gap in the research. Part III of our article presents detailed findings from our 
research on the first set of cities within our study. Part IV of our article places our 
findings within the context of other research and offers the policy implications of 
what we have learned so far, and the research still necessary. 
 
Part I: Background 
 
We first situate our research in a legal and scholarly context by providing 
a brief overview of the specific provisions of state and local law that are 
particularly relevant to infill residential development, and then we provide an 
overview of the academic literature that explores how land use regulation may have 
impacts on housing production, housing affordability, and on equity in housing 
outcomes. 
 
A. Navigating the law applicable to entitlement processes in 
California18 
 
State law governs the regulatory landscape for housing construction in 
California in two important ways. First, state law empowers and mandates local 
governments to develop their own regulatory processes to control development. 
 
California); cf. Letter from Kyle Jones to Scott Wiener (Jan. 18, 2018), https://per 
ma.cc/9HCE-2RS4 (opposing SB-827 on behalf of the Sierra Club California as “a heavy-
handed approach . . . that will ultimately lead to less transit being offered and more pollution 
generated”); Letter from Rich Gross & Jaqueline Waggoner to Scott Wiener (Apr. 9, 2018) 
(on file with authors) (opposing SB-827 on behalf of Enterprise Community Partners 
“unless it is amended to explicitly serve the housing needs of low-income Californians”); 
Letter from Brian August et al. to Scott Wiener (Mar. 20, 2018) (on file with authors) 
(opposing SB 827 on behalf of California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Housing 
California, and Western Center on Law & Poverty “unless it is amended to address the 
proposal’s impact on gentrification and exclusion”).  
17. Approval timeframes have generally been connected to higher costs of 
development. See discussion infra Section I.B.1. 
18. The approval process to obtain a building permit is referred to as the entitlement 
process. 
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Second, state law imposes additional procedural and substantive requirements on 
local government regulatory processes—we discuss one of the most important of 
those state law components, the California Environmental Quality Act.  
 
1. Local law governing infill development 
 
California law permits cities to employ a range of tools to review and 
approve housing development based on a hierarchical system of land use law.19 
The General Plan—likened to a “constitution” for long-term physical development 
of the city or county20—sits at the top of “the hierarchy of local government law 
regulating land use” in California.21 State law requires that each jurisdiction have 
a General Plan, and the General Plan must include comprehensive language that 
describes the city’s long-range vision, policies, and objectives for development. 
The General Plan codifies the city’s planning law, but it may do so with varying 
degrees of specificity. Also, with one exception, California law does not require 
that jurisdictions update their General Plan according to a set schedule; the law 
only suggests “periodic” updates.22 
Although not required by state law, some cities may also incorporate 
provisions within the General Plan for Specific Plans to address anticipated 
growth. Particularly relevant for infill development in major cities, Specific Plans 
may direct development to particular locations. Specific Plans may also be 
extremely detailed and direct nearly every aspect of development23 by codifying 
acceptable land uses24 and requiring review of proposed development for 
compliance with the Specific Plan. 
Next within this hierarchy are zoning ordinances. Zoning ordinances 
(defined generally) include maps and text that when combined provide specificity 
as to the type of development (type and intensity of use and form) permissible 
 
19. We focus exclusively on components of California land use law that are 
specifically implicated in this research study. We do not attempt to discuss the breadth and 
applicability of the complex body of law that practitioners and academics describe as “land 
use law” within California. For relevant treatises, see CECILY BARCLAY & MATTHEW GRAY, 
CURTIN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE & PLANNING LAW (Solano Press 2014); STEPHEN KOSTKA, 
PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT (CEB 2014). For a guide 
intended for planning professionals that summarizes California land use law, see WILLIAM 
FULTON & PAUL SHIGLEY, A GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA PLANNING, (Solano Press 5th ed. 2018). 
20. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65300, 65302(g)(7) (2010); see also MILLER & STARR 
CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE DIGEST, Zoning and Planning § 10 (3d ed. 2018); see DeVita v. 
Cty. of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1023–25 (Cal. 1995) (citing Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of 
Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 321–22 (Cal. 1990)). 
21. DeVita, 889 P.2d at 1023–25 (citing Neighborhood Action Grp. v. Cty. of 
Calaveras, 203 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406–07 (Ct. App. 1984)).  
22. The General Plan is comprised of seven elements: land use, open space, noise, 
circulation, housing, conservation, and safety. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65302. The Housing 
Element, which details how the jurisdiction will satisfy its allocation of the regional housing 
need, is the only element that must be updated according to a planning schedule.  
23. See KOSTKA, supra note 19, § 4.2.  
24. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65451(a); see also Hafen v. County of Orange, 26 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 584, 591 (Ct. App. 2005).  
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within specific neighborhoods.25 Zoning in California operates to restrict 
development while also incentivizing development proposed in the General Plan26 
or mandating exactions.27  
State law also carves out some local government land-use authority 
through specific mechanisms that are directly related to housing development.28 
Notable examples include Density Bonuses29 intended to incentivize and increase 
affordable housing production and an Accessory Dwelling Unit30 law intended to 
increase housing production in otherwise low-density residential neighborhoods. 
But how each city employs these tools is varied. In some cities, the 
General Plan may contain very specific language that not only guides development 
policy, it may also closely regulate the form of land use designations.31 Likewise, 
 
25. For a definition of zoning, see KOSTKA, supra note 19, § 4.1. See infra Sections 
II–IV for a discussion of “base zoning.” By “base zoning” we mean the underlying zoning 
district and use (residential, commercial, or industrial) provided for in the text of the 
ordinance and zoning map. 
26. See id. § 4.  
27. See generally CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 66000–66025; Williams Commc’ns, LLC v. 
City of Riverside, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 107–08 (Ct. App. 2003). California law broadly defines 
exactions as a monetary fee or dedication of land to the public that local governments require 
of developers as a condition of development approval. The value of the exaction cannot 
exceed “the estimated reasonable cost of providing the service or facility for which the fee 
or exaction is imposed” if it is a condition of development approval. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE 
§ 66005(a); KOSTKA, supra note 19, §§ 18.7, 18.51. The definition of “public facilities” is 
also broad, encompassing “public improvements, public services and community 
amenities.” See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 66000(d). In short, exactions are a response to the 
limits on a California city’s ability to generate revenue and offer a “nontax” way for local 
governments to get money or land from developers to support needed infrastructure and 
services. See KOSTKA, supra note 19, § 18.7. 
28. For a list of state laws limiting local authority in zoning, see KOSTKA, supra note 
19, § 4.28. 
29. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65915–65918. Density bonuses are incentives to 
encourage developers to propose new development providing for specific types of senior 
housing or affordable housing; the incentive operates by allowing the developer a “density 
increase over the maximum allowable gross residential density” where the proposed new 
development provides for senior or affordable housing. See id. § 65915(f). It also operates 
to provide waivers from specific development standards (detailed within the local or state 
law—often referred to as “on menu”) in exchange for the developer providing specific types 
(and percentages) of senior housing or affordable housing. 
30. Accessory Dwelling Units, otherwise known as ADUs, are “an attached or a 
detached residential dwelling unit which provides complete independent living facilities for 
one or more persons” that is an accessory to an existing residential use on the parcel. See 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2. State law grants local governments authority to enact local 
laws to permit ADUs that comply with a set of criteria (addressing form) even within zoning 
districts that are limited to single-family dwellings. More significantly, it imposes a 
requirement on local governments to provide a streamlined development process for 
proposed ADUs that meet specified criteria. See id. § 65852.2(a)(3). 
31. The General Plan of the City of San Jose is illustrative. See e.g., City of San Jose, 
Envision San Jose 2040 General Plan Chapter 5 at 9, http://www.sanjoseca.gov/ 
DocumentCenter/View/474 (prescribing use districts, density and Floor Area Ratio (FAR) 
ranges, and height limits). 
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a Specific Plan may be very general in some cities—and in other instances it may 
closely regulate development. To complicate things even more, California treats 
charter cities and general law cities differently on the issue of whether the city’s 
zoning ordinances must be consistent with the city’s General Plan.32 This 
sometimes results in inconsistency between a charter city’s zoning and its General 
Plan, or more specifically, the continued presence of outdated zoning ordinances 
even as the city’s policy on specific types of development changes.33 
State law also grants California cities substantial latitude in how they 
approve residential development within the framework of the relevant plans and 
zoning ordinances. We group the land use tools into four general categories. First, 
cities can allow for an objective ministerial process (or “by-right” process) when 
proposed development conforms to the underlying base zoning district’s use and 
density requirements.34 Cities can also impose requirements for subjective 
discretionary review for categories of projects that are still built within the 
framework of the zoning ordinance—in other words, the zoning ordinance itself 
contemplates that at least some property owners would propose these projects, but 
they must meet a certain set of conditions to obtain one of these types of permits. 
Examples include conditional use permits or specific plan permits.35 Cities also 
impose discretionary review when the proposed project would not comply with the 
 
32. Zoning ordinances within general law cities must be consistent with the general 
plan, but these same consistency requirements do not apply to charter cities unless the city’s 
charter requires consistency with the general plan. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 65803; 
65860(d). Charter cities within California enjoy freedom to legislate at the local level over 
“municipal affairs” even if a conflict with State law may exist under Article XI, section 5 of 
the California Constitution. This directly impacts zoning in California charter cities. 
Although the California Constitution does not expressly define “municipal affair,” land use 
and zoning are consistently classified as exempt from the planning and zoning provisions of 
the California Government Code, unless the city’s charter indicates otherwise. See City of 
Irvine v. Irvine Citizens Against Overdevelopment, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797, 799–800 (Ct. App. 
1994). But the provisions of a general plan within every city must be internally consistent. 
See CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 65302, 65300.5. 
33. The City of San Jose is illustrative. Of the forty-six rezonings in the City of San 
Jose, fifteen involved wholesale changes in use district—for example from Light Industrial 
to a residential designation—and many others involved more intensive escalations in 
residential density. Only one of these fifteen rezonings required a General Plan Amendment; 
only three of the remaining thirty-one rezonings required a General Plan Amendment. The 
fact that General Plan Amendments were not necessary shows that the General Plan 
permitted the desired use and intensity of the development. This suggests that the base 
zoning in some locations had not been updated after the most recent General Plan enactment. 
34. Ministerial approvals are approvals in which a government agency simply 
applies law to fact without using subjective judgment. In Friends of Westwood Inc. v. City 
of Los Angeles, 235 Cal. Rptr. 788, 793 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court of Appeal held that “the 
touchstone” of the discretionary-ministerial distinction “is whether the approval process 
involved allows the government to shape the project in any way which could respond to any 
of the concerns which might be identified in an environmental impact report.” 
35. See e.g., S.F. MUNI. CODE § 329 (describing Large Project Authorizations for 
Eastern Neighborhoods Plan Area); S.F. MUNI. CODE § 303 (describing Conditional Use 
Authorization requirements applicable across all zones); REDWOOD CITY MUNI. CODE § 
47.1–47.5 (describing Planned Community permits for areas with a Precise Plan in place). 
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applicable zoning ordinance; this includes when the developer is seeking an 
exemption from the zoning ordinance (variance) or asking the city to zone the 
project site differently (rezoning), or to change or update the General Plan to allow 
for the proposed project.  
Finally, cities in California can also impose discretionary review even 
when a proposed project is consistent with the underlying base zoning district’s 
use and development controls; in other words, cities can provide for development 
standards (including density and use), while also imposing aesthetic controls that 
may impose discretionary review that is particularly subjective in nature.36 
Examples of this include design review, architectural review, site development 
review, and historical preservation review/certificate of appropriateness.37  
Another important feature within local law relevant to infill development 
is the regulation of subdivision, or the process of dividing land into two or more 
parcels for the purpose of sale, lease, or financing.38 Subdivision can be 
horizontal—dividing a single parcel of land into two or more units—or vertical—
dividing the airspace above the land into two or more units.39 Also important for 
infill development within central cities are Development Agreements, which allow 
for cities to enter into agreements with developers through a local legislative act 
that “freezes” the applicable land use regulations (including zoning) for the 
property to protect the developer from any adverse impacts imposed by changes to 
the development standards during the development process.40 Development 
Agreements are relevant to large phased development projects.  
 
36. See BRIAN BLAESSER, DISCRETIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS: AVOIDING 
INVITATIONS TO ABUSE OF DISCRETION XIX, XX, 11 (6th ed. 2003) (noting that many of the 
discretionary provisions involve “community character” components that are highly 
subjective, that design codes increasingly involve subjective standards that “emphasize 
flexibility over precision” and that “[a]rchitectural design review ordinances provide some 
of the worst examples of vague statements of purpose and overbroad standards that invite 
abuse. Such ordinances frequently lack sufficiently clear standards and vest too much 
subjective decision making in the architectural review board officials.”). 
37. For design review-related provisions, see REDWOOD CITY MUNI. CODE § 45.2(A); 
PALO ALTO MUNI. CODE § 18.76.020(b)(2)(D); OAKLAND MUNI. CODE §§ 17.136.040(3)–
(4). For a historic preservation-related provision, see S.F. MUNI. CODE § 1006. For site 
development review, see SAN JOSE MUNI. CODE § 20.100.010. 
38. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66424. 
39. The California Subdivision Map Act regulates the design and improvement of 
subdivision; however, local governments control these design and improvements through 
the enactment of a local subdivision ordinance. Id. § 66411. The process begins when a 
developer seeking to create five or more units of land files a Tentative Map application. Id. 
§ 66428(b). After the approval of the Tentative Map, the developer must comply with any 
imposed conditions before filing for Final Map approval. Id. § 66457. For the purposes of 
the California Environmental Quality Act (see discussion infra Section I.A.2), the Tentative 
Map is the discretionary trigger—Final Maps are not typically discretionary actions. Id. § 
66474.1. For this reason, we have tracked Tentative Map approvals, not Final Map 
approvals. State and local law also governs the consolidation or merger of lots into a single 
lot, termed a lot line adjustment. Id. § 66412(d). Certain lot line adjustments do not require 
tentative maps. Id. § 66412(d). 
40. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65867. For a general description, see KARL E. GEIER & 
SEAN R. MARCINIAK, MILLER AND STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 21:29 (4th ed. 2015).  
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2. Environmental review under the California Environmental Quality 
Act 
 
Modeled after the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), CEQA 
combines mandatory information disclosure with public participation to “open[] 
government decision-making to public scrutiny.”41 CEQA is “[o]ne of California’s 
most cherished institutions and one of its most controversial.”42 CEQA’s focus is 
on government projects and approvals that produce significant environmental 
impacts.43 
 
a. Local governments often determine CEQA’s applicability 
 
CEQA applies to any residential development project that requires a 
public agency’s discretionary approval.44 In the context of urban land development, 
the lead public agency is usually the local Planning Department45 and with some 
exceptions, it is the lead agency that determines whether the required approval is 
discretionary or ministerial.46 Though building permits are presumptively 
ministerial (or “by right”), local agencies can specify otherwise in their laws.47 
Conditional or special use permits, variances, Development Agreements, 
subdivision maps, or zoning changes are typically discretionary approvals48 
because Planning Departments are not legally obligated to grant these types of 
 
41. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 913 (2002). 
42. See JOHN LANDIS, ROLF PENDALL, ROBERT OLSHANSKY & WILLIAM HUANG, 
FIXING CEQA: OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORMING THE CALIFORNIA 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT 1 (Cal. Pol’y Seminar ed., 1995). 
43. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.  
44. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080. 
45. State law requires each city and county to have a planning agency—either an 
administrative body or a commission—to carry out the state planning laws, which include 
General Plan laws discussed in this Part. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 65100, 65101. Planning 
agencies generally enforce the local zoning code and make land use determinations. See 
MILLER & STARR, 7 CAL. REAL EST. § 21:1 (4th ed., 2015). 
46. See CEQA GUIDELINES § 15369 (2016) (codified at 14 C.C.R. § 15369 (2016)). 
“CEQA Guidelines” refers to Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations, which 
implement PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 et seq. See Friends of Westwood Inc., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 
793 (finding building permits to be presumptively ministerial).  
47. See CEQA GUIDELINES § 15268(b). San Francisco is one city that makes building 
permits discretionary through their charter. See discussion infra Section IV. 
48. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583.2 (“the phrase ‘use by right’ shall mean that the 
local government’s review of the owner-occupied or multifamily residential use may not 
require a conditional use permit, planned unit development permit, or other discretionary 
local government review or approval that would constitute a ‘project’ for purposes of 
[CEQA]”). Another example is provided through the state law that requires that 
Development Agreements be adopted by a local legislative act, preventing them from being 
ministerial approvals. See supra note 33. 
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approvals; instead, they use discretionary judgment to evaluate the project based 
on subjective criteria.49  
Discretionary projects may still be exempt from CEQA. The legislature 
has carved out statutory exemptions in the Public Resources Code, and thirty-three 
categorical exemptions have been developed in the California Code of Regulations, 
which are more commonly referred to as the CEQA Guidelines.50 In this article, 
we focus on the exemptions most relevant to infill development. For example, a 
lead agency can use the Class 32 infill exemption for infill development; if an urban 
infill project satisfies five conditions, it can bypass CEQA review.51 Other common 
forms of exemptions are the Class 3 exemption for new construction or conversion 
of small structures and the Class 1 exemption for existing facilities.52 
Tiering is a way to streamline environmental review under CEQA by 
allowing environmental review of a proposed project to focus on a narrow set of 
issues that have not already been evaluated in a prior Environmental Impact Report 
(“EIR”). If all the issues have been evaluated in a previous EIR, then no further 
study is necessary. Tiering necessarily requires a prior environmental review 
document (generally an EIR) that is usually connected to a prior and large-scale 
planning approval; however, the source of the document can vary. A Community 
Plan Exemption, for example, is a tiering-based exemption available to projects 
consistent with a community plan, general plan, or zoning.53 Another form of 
tiering is the Program EIR, which can exempt future development activity from 
environmental review, provided that no underlying conditions have changed.54 An 
EIR Addendum is commonly used for projects that will be built out in phases under 
a master plan and master EIR where the underlying conditions of approval have 
not changed.55 If some of these conditions have changed, then the lead agency can 
prepare a Supplemental EIR, which only needs to contain information necessary to 
make the original EIR adequate.56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49. See CEQA GUIDELINES §15357.  
50. Id. §§ 15300–15333. 
51. Id. § 15332. These factors are: (1) the project is consistent with the applicable 
general plan designation and all applicable general plan policies as well as with applicable 
zoning designation and regulations; (2) the proposed development occurs within city limits 
on a project site of no more than five acres substantially surrounded by urban uses; (3) the 
project site has no value, as habitat for endangered, rare or threatened species; (4) approval 
of the project would not result in any significant effects relating to traffic, noise, air quality, 
or water quality; and (5) the site can be adequately served by all required utilities and public 
services. 
52. See id. §§ 15303, 15301. 
53. See CEQA GUIDELINES § 15183. 
54. See id. § 15168. 
55. See id. § 15162. 
56. See id. § 15163. 
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Figure 1: Types of Environmental Review 
 
 
b. The disclosure requirements under CEQA 
 
For projects that are not categorically exempt or exempt based on prior 
EIR analysis, the lead agency conducts an Initial Study57 to assess whether the 
project will have a significant effect on the environment. If not, the agency issues 
a Negative Declaration (“ND”).58 If the project will have a significant effect on the 
environment, but the developer can incorporate mitigations that reduce their 
significance, then the agency issues a Mitigated Negative Declaration (“MND”).59 
A lead agency must prepare an EIR where there is substantial evidence that the 
project will have a significant effect on the environment60 and where it is not clear 
from the Initial Study that these impacts can be mitigated below a significance 
threshold.61  
An important debate in the context of CEQA implementation is over the 
merits of project-specific CEQA review (which focuses on individual projects) and 
plan- or program-level CEQA review (e.g., review focused on Specific Plans, 
neighborhoods, or city-wide programs). One issue is the effectiveness of project-
specific review. On the one hand, CEQA’s information mandate when applied at 
the project level can force agencies to “identify and confront the environmental 
consequences of their actions” in that particular project.62 CEQA’s procedural 
 
57. See CEQA GUIDELINES § 15063(a).  
58. Id. § 15070(a). 
59. Id. § 15070(b)(2). 
60. Id. § 15063(b)(1), § 15060 (indicating a project may also bypass the Initial Study 
to proceed directly to the EIR) 
61. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21064.5; CEQA GUIDELINES § 15070.  
62. Karkkainen, supra note 41, at 904. 
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requirements can enable cost-effective mitigation, because agencies can take into 
account “the site-specific circumstances” of the project “in a flexible manner” and 
propose feasible mitigations in a way that applying blanket regulations would not.63 
CEQA also operates to mitigate project-specific environmental problems where 
there are lapses in regulation because its procedural framework is sufficiently 
flexible to mitigate environmental problems that other, more general laws are 
slower to address.64 A project-specific EIR, however, cannot inform a long-term 
perspective or mitigate the regional and cumulative effects of development that are 
better suited to the general plan process.65 
The other issue relates to cost. As noted above, plan or program-level 
EIRs can generally reduce the costs of subsequent CEQA review through tiering: 
prior research has found the differences between a Categorical Exemption, MND, 
and EIR, in time and cost, can be great.66 Therefore, tiering that allows project-
level review to occur at the MND or Categorical Exemption level can reduce 
project-level costs substantially. However, cities generally pay the costs of plan- 
or program-level CEQA review, while developers pay for the costs of project-
specific CEQA related documents and studies.67 For cash-strapped jurisdictions, 
particularly in the wake of Proposition 13, which reduces the amount of property 
taxes that stay within local jurisdictions,68 the project-specific EIR presents a more 
economically feasible way of considering environmental effects than an update to 
 
63. ELISA BARBOUR & MICHAEL TEITZ, CEQA REFORM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 4 (Pub. 
Pol’y Inst. of Cal. ed., 2005) (emphasis omitted). 
64. See id. for a further discussion of how CEQA fills these regulatory gaps; Giulia 
Gualco-Nelson, Reversing Course in California: Moving CEQA Forward, 44 ECOL. L. Q. 
155, 164 (2017).  
65. See Robert Olshansky, The California Environmental Quality Act and Local 
Planning, 62 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 313, 317 (1996). EIRs are very effective tools to analyze 
project-specific impacts but many environmental effects are cumulative in that they are not 
traceable to a single project. Traffic, for example, is a regional issue stemming from historic 
patterns of land use and disinvestment in public transportation. Unfortunately, instead of 
promoting long-term planning, CEQA often “burden[s] a single project with all of a region’s 
problems”—a nearly impossible undertaking. Id.  
66. See Kenneth Bley, Beware of Planners Bearing Gifts, COX CASTLE NICHOLSON 
(Jan. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/HD4K-MDNH (noting that “[p]reparing an MND . . . also 
requires significant time and money, although, in the short run, less than an EIR). 
Substantively, EIRs must contain more detail and studies than an MND. EIRs require (1) 
detailed information about the proposed project’s significant effects on the environment; (2) 
ways in which the significant effects of such a project might be minimized; and (3) 
alternatives to the project. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061. However, in long the run, as 
Bley notes, if there are legal challenges, MNDs might end up costing more because they are 
potentially less defensible in court. See Bley, supra note 66 (discussing the standards of 
review for an MND and EIR).  
67. See Olshansky, supra note 65, at 319-20. 
68. Passed as a voter initiative in 1978, Proposition 13 is an amendment to the 
California Constitution that froze property tax values at 1976 assessed value levels and fixed 
tax increases at a maximum of two percent per annum. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1(a), 
2(a). This has led to a sharp decline in the revenue local governments receive from property 
tax revenue. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, COMMON CLAIMS ABOUT PROPOSITION 13 
at 2 (2016). 
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the General Plan because it effectively shifts the costs of CEQA compliance to 
individual developers.69 The cost of a project-specific EIR, for example, is 
significantly lower than the cost of a General Plan update (typically financed from 
the city’s general fund), and the project applicant bears most of the cost.70  
Critics have also attacked the way agencies unpredictably apply CEQA 
both within the same jurisdiction and across the state, an inconsistency that critics 
say increases not only the time and money spent on CEQA review, but also the risk 
of litigation.71 And some critics question whether or not CEQA actually leads to 
meaningful mitigation of harm.72 Because CEQA leaves implementation entirely 
to local control, agencies can weigh environmental harms and social or economic 
benefits differently.73 
 
c. The public participation requirements of CEQA 
 
Public participation is the democratic cornerstone of CEQA. CEQA has 
strict notice provisions that enable the public to participate in every major phase of 
environmental review. The notice requirements are demanding for an EIR. 
Immediately after determining that an EIR is necessary, the lead agency must issue 
a Notice of Preparation.74 After posting this notice, the agency begins work on the 
Draft EIR. The agency must then notice and post the Draft EIR for public review 
for at least thirty days.75 During this period, the public submits comments about 
the agency’s findings. The lead agency must review and prepare a written response 
to all comments received during this period.76 The agency incorporates these 
responses into the Final EIR and then recirculates it to the public.77 Within five 
days of certifying the Final EIR, the agency will file a public Notice of 
Determination (“NOD”) with the county clerk.78 
The Office of Natural Resources promulgates CEQA guidelines for 
implementation, but no state agency substantively oversees CEQA.79 Citizen suits 
are the sole enforcement mechanism to ensure a lead agency’s compliance. NODs 
trigger the statute of limitations to bring suit,80 and CEQA lawsuits are easy to file. 
Filing fees are relatively inexpensive, and courts limit proceedings to the 
administrative record, which obviates the need for a lengthy discovery process.81 
 
69. See Olshansky, supra note 65, at 320. 
70. Id. at 319–20. In 1996, the average cost of an EIR was $38,214. The average cost 
of a General Plan was $208,000. 
71. See BARBOUR & TEITZ, supra note 63, at 15. 
72. Id. at 25. 
73. Id.  
74. CEQA GUIDELINES § 15082. 
75. Id. § 15105. 
76. Id. § 15088. 
77. Id. §§ 15088, 15132. 
78. Id. § 21152(a). 
79. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21083. 
80. Id. at § 21167. 
81. See KOSTKA, supra note 19, § 23.48 (discussing admissibility of extra-record 
evidence). 
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CEQA also allows plaintiffs to easily satisfy standing requirements.82 The ease of 
CEQA litigation has been a source of significant criticism of the statute, with critics 
arguing that it increases uncertainty and costs for developers.83 
 
B. What prior research has told us about the impact of 
California’s land use regulations on housing supply and 
spatial equality 
 
Meeting California’s statewide goals to reduce GHG emissions requires 
equitable infill development. Housing development properly focused in infill TOD 
areas may significantly reduce emissions in part by increasing transit usage84 and 
reducing vehicle miles traveled.85 The state legislature has recognized that meeting 
GHG reduction targets through increased transit use requires the adoption of 
sustainable, integrated regional transportation and community planning 
strategies.86 Research suggests, however, that law promoting sustainable urban 
development without an equity focus may lead to “environmental gentrification”87 
and may directly undermine intended policy goals of reducing GHG emissions.88 
 
82. In Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach, the California 
Supreme Court refused to apply the federal “zone of interests” test for CEQA litigation. 254 
P.3d 1005, 1012–13 (Cal. 2011). Limiting standing under CEQA has been proposed as a 
way to reduce the proliferation of CEQA litigation. See Eric Biber, Could Standing Save 
CEQA? LEGAL PLANET (Apr. 9, 2012), https://perma.cc/7CHE-HKR3.  
83. See BARBOUR & TEITZ, supra note 63, at iii. 
84. NATHANIEL DECKER, CAROL GALANTE, KAREN CHAPPLE & AMY MARTIN, RIGHT 
TYPE, RIGHT PLACE: ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF INFILL 
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH 2030 11–12 (Next 10 ed., 2017). 
85. Arefeh Nasri & Lei Zhang, The Analysis of Transit-Oriented Development 
(TOD) in Washington, DC and Baltimore Metropolitan Areas, 32 TRANSPORT POL’Y 172, 
179 (2014). 
86. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65400. 
87. See, e.g., MALO HUTSON, THE URBAN STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC, 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: DEEPENING THEIR ROOTS 20 (Routledge ed., 2016) 
(citing Melissa Checker, Wiped Out by the “Greenwave”: Environmental Gentrification 
and the Paradoxical Politics of Urban Sustainability, 23 CITY & SOC’Y 210, 210 (2011) 
(“While it appears as politically-neutral, consensus-based planning that is both ecologically 
and socially sensitive, in practice, environmental gentrification subordinates equity to profit-
minded development”)); Hamil Pearsall, Moving out or Moving in? Resilience to 
Environmental Gentrification, 17 LOC. ENV’T 1013, 1013 (2012) (“Sustainability initiatives 
and environmental improvements that lack adequate attention to the social justice dimension 
of environmental change produce environmental gentrification”).  
88. Notably, the characteristics of ridership also suggest that if low-income 
communities that have historically lived in central city neighborhoods and used transit at 
the highest rates are displaced from central cities, TOD investment may not achieve its 
intended policy goals. See Robert Cervero, Transit-Oriented Development’s Ridership 
Bonus: A Product of Self-Selection and Public Policies, 39 ENV’T & PLAN. 2068, 2083–84 
(2007). The decline of transit ridership in Los Angeles, despite new investments in public 
transportation and upzoning around these stations, is an acute example of this issue. See 
MICHAEL MANVILLE ET AL., FALLING TRANSIT RIDERSHIP: CALIFORNIA AND SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIA (S. Cal. Ass’n of Gov’ts ed., 2018). Also, the LAO reported that low-income 
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Multiple studies examine the relationship between land use regulation and 
its specific impacts on housing supply and housing costs as well as its impacts on 
spatial equality. We thus discuss and summarize the findings and methods of two 
research areas: (1) studies that explore the relationship of land use regulation on 
housing supply and costs (indirect or direct impact on housing costs), and (2) 
studies that explore the relationship of land use regulation on spatial equality 
(indirect or direct impact on segregation/exclusion).89 Our summary identifies the 
key conclusions of that literature, and how the current methodological approaches 
of that literature limit the ability to either generalize from the study findings or 
identify specific policy solutions. 
1. Understanding land use regulation as a constraint on supply 
 
California’s home prices and rents are higher than anywhere else in the 
country; home prices are 2.5 times the national average and rents are fifty percent 
higher.90 Using basic supply and demand economics, urban economists posit that 
a sharp decline in supply beginning in the 1970s has led to the affordability crises 
in many of the nation’s coastal cities, like those in California, where the labor 
market is strong and demand for housing is high.91 Building on the work of William 
Fischel—who coined the term “homevoter hypothesis” to describe a home owner’s 
 
families that work within coastal communities, but cannot afford housing near their work, 
commute ten percent farther than commuters elsewhere and concluded that high housing 
costs that result in longer commutes risk undermining the goals of recent legislation intended 
to address climate change. See LAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. 
89. We focus here only on research that directly touches on the debates over housing 
costs and regulation in California. The relevant literature that engages with the impact of 
land use regulation (defined broadly to encompass both local land use regulations and state 
law) on both housing costs and spatial equality is large. For a comprehensive literature 
review that focuses on an econometric analysis of land use regulation see generally, Joseph 
Gyourko & Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research 
Working Paper No. 20536, 2014). For a summary of studies and writing on how stringency 
within land use regulation impacts supply, see Vicki Been, City NIMBYs, 33 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 217, 223 n.24 (2018). For a review of the literature that engages public investment 
(related to land use) and gentrification and displacement, see Miriam Zuk et. al, 
Gentrification, Displacement and the Role of Public Investment: A Literature Review, 
URBAN DISPLACEMENT (Mar. 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/QER4-XC2H. 
90. See LAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. 
91. See LAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 7 (“Beginning in about 1970, however, home 
prices throughout the state began to accelerate. Prices were eighty percent above U.S. levels 
by 1980, and by 2010, the typical California home was twice as expensive as the typical 
U.S. home”); see also Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven Saks, Why is 
Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J. L. & ECON. 331, 
337 (2005) (beginning in the 1970s, the U.S. experienced a sharp decline in the supply of 
housing nationwide). Other studies have found a sharp decline in building permits beginning 
in the 1990s. See CAL. DEPT. HOUSING & CMTY. DEV., CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING FUTURE: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 6 (2018). 
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inherent motivation to maximize the value of their property92— much urban 
economics research attributes the change in housing production to the rise of 
“historical preservationists in New York City [and] conservationists in 
California. . . .”93 In this literature, supply constraints are the primary cost of land 
use regulation. These studies reach this result by measuring the gap between the 
physical costs of producing the housing unit and the sales price for the housing 
unit.94 If the gap between production costs and sales price is narrow, the market is 
efficient and affordable; where the gap between sale price and production costs is 
wider, housing is unaffordable. Large disparities between price and production cost 
are generally understood as indirect evidence of the costs of land use regulation.95 
Because of the difficulty of measuring the impact of particular land use policies, 96 
urban economists use proxies such as declining permitting levels, declining heights 
and densities, and increasing sale prices, which together provide indirect evidence 
for a “regulatory tax.”97 
In 2002 Glaeser and Gyourko found that generally home sale prices are 
within forty percent of hard construction costs nationwide, but California’s housing 
prices were substantially higher than construction costs.98 They concluded the gap 
between hard costs and sale price is not a function of higher land costs,99 and found 
that stringent land use regulation which imposes longer than average100 lag times 
between permit application and approval creates an “implicit zoning tax.”101 
However, for our purposes a key limitation of this research is that it is unable to 
isolate which land use regulations might impose the lag time in development.102 
 
92. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 5 (Harvard Univ. Press ed., 
2001); William A. Fischel, A Property Rights Approach to Municipal Zoning, 54 LAND 
ECON. 64, 68 (1978). 
93. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing 
Supply 3 (Zell/Lurie, Working Paper No. 802, 2017). 
94. See id. at 5; Glaeser, Gyourko & Saks, supra note 91, at 336. 
95. Glaeser, Gyourko & Saks, supra note 91, at 336. 
96. Id. at 333. 
97. Id. at 335. 
98. Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14, at 21.  
99. Id. at 17. Because the cost of a house on a 10,000 square foot lot versus an 
identical house on a 15,000 square foot lot is close in value, if high land values were a real 
driver of cost, the house on the larger lot would be worth more. But high prices were not 
associated with higher densities. A classic free market land model would suggest that 
densities would increase as land becomes more expensive due to an exogenous scarcity, but 
in California the researchers found that high cost areas were associated with lower not higher 
densities. One notable caveat to this study is that the authors only use data from single-
family home sales and exclude all multifamily, cooperative or condominium sales. Thus, 
their approximation of “density” will likely skew lower. More expensive, but comparatively 
less dense, housing presents indirect evidence of stringent land use regulation 
100. Defined as six months based on the underlying survey. Id. at 19–20. 
101. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14, at 17. Glaeser & Gyourko derive this 
data from the 1989 Wharton Land Use Control Survey, a precursor to the Wharton 
Residential Land Use Regulatory Index (“WRLURI”). See discussion infra Section I.B.1(a).  
102. These studies also employ national averages to describe very local issues. For 
example, some studies use RS Means Construction data for hard construction costs, which 
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a. Exploring stringency and constraints on housing supply through 
national surveys 
 
In an effort to understand how regulations might shape housing costs, in 
the 2000’s two groups of researchers completed two national surveys that both 
contributed to the analysis of the financial cost of land use regulation and produced 
 
reflects national averages of construction costs per square foot rather than actual costs. To 
adjust these national averages for certain metro regions, RS Means inflates them by a set 
percentage. This inflation, however, does not consider higher than average labor cost or 
equipment costs in a particular location. Building in expensive metro areas is spatially 
constrained and requires higher costs for staging, storage, and transportation. See About 
RSMeans Data, RSMEANS DATA (Oct. 23, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://perma.cc/A37F-2ANS. 
Labor markets also tend to be stronger in high cost areas, which increases construction costs. 
According to the California Legislative Analyst’s 2015 report, these factors heavily 
influence the cost of housing construction in California. See LAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 
14. Also, a recent McKinsey study suggests that low construction productivity is a major 
driver of construction costs and time delays. FILIPE BARBOSA ET AL., REINVENTING 
CONSTRUCTION: A ROUTE TO HIGHER PRODUCTIVITY 2–3 (McKinsey Global Inst. ed., 2017). 
(noting that in its sample “over the past ten years less than one-quarter of construction firms 
have matched the productivity growth achieved in the overall economies in which they 
work, and there is a long tail of usually smaller players with very poor productivity. Many 
construction projects suffer from overruns in cost and time.”). 
In addition, while the studies assume efficient market conditions, in reality, home 
sale prices include all the transaction costs that the developer needs to recoup, such as the 
cost of financing (carrying capital, lender origination fees, issuance fees, insurance), 
investor ROI (which is typically higher in high cost metro areas), legal fees, taxes, and 
developer and contractor profit. See, e.g., Memorandum from Keyser Marston Assoc., to 
Pleasant Hill BART Station Leasing Auth., (Nov. 12, 2014) http://www.co.contra-costa. 
ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/34410/Condominium-Feasibility-Study (describing a 
developer’s pro forma feasibility analysis for condominiums adjacent to the Pleasant Hill 
BART station: “The output of the pro forma is the average condo sale price required for 
project feasibility. The pro forma estimates the costs to build the project including land 
acquisition, direct construction costs, and indirect and financing costs.” These costs must be 
recouped for the project to be feasible.) 
 Though land use regulation can certainly increase these costs by prolonging the 
approvals process, many of these costs exist independent of land use regulation. 
In 2005, Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks made a better case for the regulatory tax 
formula as applied to the housing market in Manhattan. In Manhattan, where most people 
live in dense multifamily structures, the cost of adding an additional floor of units is the 
marginal cost of building up rather than the cost of purchasing additional land. This implies 
that choosing to add an additional floor would be a function of regulatory approvals rather 
than the availability of land. The study found that buildings today are on average shorter 
than they were from the beginning of the century to the 1970s. Moreover, the ratio of sales 
price to construction costs fluctuated between 1.5 and 1.7 throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
This suggests that regulation prevents developers from maximizing density, which would 
tie the sale price to construction cost. The authors also suggest that the regulatory tax is not 
solely a product of laws on the books, but rather how these laws are applied and 
supplemented their data with case studies of wealthy New York constituents that organized 
to block a 17-story apartment building on the Upper East Side. Though the underlying 
zoning actually permitted the 17-story height, the wealthy neighborhood constituents used 
landmark preservation law to reduce the building height to nine stories. See Glaeser, 
Gyourko & Saks, supra note 91, at 334. 
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important datasets that other researchers would rely on.103 In 2006 Pendall, 
Puentes, and Martin published the results of their survey of land use in 1,844 
jurisdictions from the fifty largest metropolitan areas. The survey asked planning 
staff about their perceptions of the jurisdiction’s use of zoning, comprehensive 
planning, growth containment measures, impact fees, building permit caps, or 
affordable housing incentives, and for perceptions of regulation (more or less) from 
the 1970s to 1990s.104 The team then coded these results to create “regulatory 
clusters” (groups of jurisdictions with similar land use typologies) on a spectrum—
traditional (typically the most exclusionary), reform, and deregulated 
jurisdictions.105 To gauge the level of exclusionary land use regulation, the survey 
asked whether a jurisdiction would allow construction by right or by special permit 
of a forty-unit two-story apartment building sitting on five acres.106  
In terms of permissive zoning, the most exclusionary jurisdictions were 
in the Northeast, whereas San Francisco, San Diego, Seattle, and other western 
metro areas were the least exclusionary.107 At that time, nearly two-thirds of the 
Western metro regions surveyed had affordable housing incentive programs and 
nearly half had dedicated affordable housing funds.108 Although zoning in Western 
metro regions might have been the most permissive in terms of density and variety 
of housing stock (in some cases even rivaling New York), these western 
jurisdictions used other regulatory tools—like urban growth containment 
measures, impact fees, and permit caps—that made it more expensive and difficult 
to develop housing.109 
Pendall’s 2006 study does not explain how affordable housing incentives 
can modify an underlying exclusionary land use system (for example, by 
exempting affordable housing from certain impact fees), but the study results 
suggest that some metro regions, though ostensibly committed to constructing 
affordable housing, are actually employing regulatory tools that decrease supply, 
or that there could be a mismatch between means and ends. Housing prices were 
highest in “reform” jurisdictions that have permissive underlying zoning but 
employ a variety of land use tools that include growth control (e.g., San Francisco 
and Denver).110 And housing costs in these areas are higher than in the North East 
where traditional exclusionary zoning is employed.111 
 
103. See, e.g., Rothwell & Massey infra FN 196. 
104. Rolf Pendall, Robert Puentes & Jonathan Martin, From Traditional to 
Reformed: A Review of the Land Use Regulations in the Nation’s 50 Largest Metropolitan 
Areas, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 7–8 (2006), https://perma.cc/3CKU-PZAK. The survey 
tool is also available at https://perma.cc/VG98-SWAM. 
105. Id. at 19. 
106. Id. at 7.  
107. Id. at 13. 
108. Since the time of the Pendall study, California has dissolved its Redevelopment 
Agencies—a primary source of affordable housing funding, which has negatively impacted 
many of these funds. See discussion infra Section III. 
109. See id. at 14 (containment), 17 (impact fees), 19 (permit caps).  
110. Id. at 31.  
111. Id. at 30. Unsurprisingly Houston and Dallas-San Antonio, which the study 
considered nearly unregulated with the exception of impact fees, had the lowest housing 
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The Pendall study does not examine whether the jurisdiction requires 
environmental review, which in California impacts the type of housing that can be 
built regardless of the underlying zoning controls. Because of the national scope, 
the study also did not focus on how land use regulations are applied. For example, 
Pendall notes that San Francisco has permit caps, but fails to note that they apply 
only to certain commercial developments and not residential or mixed-use 
properties.112 These issues are likely applicable to other jurisdictions as well. 
At around the same time as the Pendall survey, Gyourko, Saiz, and 
Summers conducted another major national survey of land use practices to build 
the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index (“WRLURI”) with the aim of 
determining the “average” degree of land use regulation in the nation by focusing 
on process and outcomes, rather than just the presence of regulatory constraints.113 
The WRULRI distributed a fifteen-question survey to planning officials in 2,649 
jurisdictions.114 Participants ranked their perception of the importance of certain 
factors that influence local government decisions on how to regulate the rate of 
residential development on a 1-5 scale.115 They also ranked the involvement of 
certain organizations—including local councils, communities, state legislature, 
and local courts—in the land use regulation process. The survey asked respondents 
to (a) identify how much the cost of land development has increased in the last ten 
years as well as the average length of the entitlement process as compared to ten 
years ago; (b) provide the number of board and commission approvals required to 
approve projects with zoning changes versus projects without zoning changes; (c) 
identify whether the community has permit caps, minimum lot size requirements, 
and open space or affordable housing or infrastructure exactions; and (d) identify 
the number of applications for zoning changes filed and approved in the last year. 
To assess each state legislature’s involvement in the planning process and the 
involvement of the state courts, Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers used Foster and 
Summers’s fifty state survey116 that determined the features typical of judicial 
 
prices. While Pendall 2006 notes that housing prices were once low in Austin, the study 
notes that the growth of the high-tech sector has increased housing costs above Houston and 
San Antonio. Housing prices aside, reform jurisdictions and Texas had more in common in 
terms of social demographics. Both have higher concentration of college graduates in their 
central city than in their suburbs. Low-income people and people of color were dispersed 
more evenly throughout the suburbs in reform areas and Texas, whereas they are primarily 
concentrated in the central city in traditional jurisdictions. 
112. See, e.g., S.F. Planning Dep’t, Office Development Annual Limitation Program, 
(Oct. 23, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://perma.cc/DN94-CDKW. In 1985, San Francisco enacted 
the Annual Office Limit Program which caps the annual permitting of office space on a 
square foot basis; this square footage limitation does not apply to residential housing. 
113. Joseph Gyourko, Albert Saiz & Anita Summers, A New Measure of the Local 
Regulatory Environment for Housing Markets: The Wharton Residential Land Use 
Regulatory Index, 45 URB. STUD. 693, 694 (2008).  
114. Id. at 696. 
115. Id. at 719–21. Some of these factors included supply of land, cost of new 
infrastructure, density restrictions, impact fees, opposition to growth, and school crowding. 
116. See DAVID FOSTER & ANITA SUMMERS, CURRENT STATE LEGISLATIVE AND 
JUDICIAL PROFILES ON LAND-USE REGULATIONS IN THE US 3–8 (2007) (surveying land use 
laws—such as legal standards for exactions—in all 50 states). 
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review for exactions, fair share development requirements, building moratoria, and 
spot zoning.117 They also used data on ballot box planning measures from a 
database that tracks initiatives nationwide.118 The authors then created an index of 
eleven land use stringency indicators: local political pressure, state political 
involvement, state court involvement, local zoning approval (includes 
environmental review), local project approval, local assembly (democracy), supply 
restrictions, density restrictions, open space, exactions, and approval delay.119  
The WRLURI’s stringency index provided policymakers a general 
assessment and comparative analysis of whether a jurisdiction’s land use system is 
more or less “stringent” and whether it imposes more lag time to approvals. In the 
least regulated community nationally, density restrictions were relatively 
permissive, open space requirements were unlikely to be imposed, and the lag time 
between application and issuance of a building permit was approximately three 
months.120 The average community required two levels of approvals to grant a 
zoning change and at least one approval for a project without a zoning change, but 
did not put project approvals to a popular vote by the community, and minimum 
lot sizes, open space, and exactions were not onerous.121 The typical lag between 
application and permit issuance was six months.122 The most stringently regulated 
communities required a local popular vote to approve a project and one more level 
of approval for a project even without a zoning change; density restrictions and 
high minimum lot sizes were also more prevalent.123 The average approval timeline 
in stringently regulated communities was 10.5 months.124 Stringently regulated 
communities tended to have high stringency values for all the land use 
indicators.125 Stringency was also strongly correlated with community wealth.126 
Interestingly, regulations were highly variable even within the same state, 
highlighting the ubiquity of local rather than state control.127  
 
117. Gyourko, Saiz & Summers, supra note 113, at 701. See also FOSTER & 
SUMMERS, supra note 116, at 3. The Foster and Summers 50 state survey ranked states on a 
scale of 1 to 3: states that scored a 1 gave little deference to local municipalities; states that 
scored a 3 nearly always defer to the municipality. The number of cases consulted per state 
ranges from one in Alaska to a high of fifteen in California. Foster & Summers also used 
information on new legislative enactments and governor’s actions to rank the state 
legislative involvement on the same scale. 
118. Gyourko, Saiz & Summers, supra note 113, at 698 (citing TRUST FOR THE 
PUBLIC LAND, LANDVOTE DATABASE, https://tpl.quickbase.com/db/bbqna2qct?a =dbpage& 
pageID=10 (last visited Oct. 24, 2018)). 
119. Gyourko, Saiz & Summers, supra note 113, at 698–701. 
120. Gyourko, Saiz & Summers, supra note 113, at 709, 714. 
121. Id. at 707. 
122. Id. at 708. 
123. Id. at 708. 
124. Id. at 710. 
125. Gyourko, Saiz & Summers, supra note 113, at  710. 
126. Id. at 710. 
127. Id. at 712 (“For example, in Massachusetts which has a state average that is 1.56 
standard deviations above the national mean, 10 per cent of the communities (8 out of 79) 
still have WRLURI values below zero and thus are more lightly regulated than the average 
place in the country”). 
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In 2018, the WRLURI continues to remain highly influential. The finding 
that stringency is associated with higher housing costs is particularly important 
because it drives much of the policy debate around land use in California.128 The 
index also has been used in subsequent studies129 and informs survey design for 
related research.130  
For instance, many researchers have used the WRLURI to examine 
relationships between housing supply and other variables. In 2010, Saiz used the 
WRLURI and satellite data to establish that the most geographically constrained 
jurisdictions—meaning the jurisdictions with the least available land to 
develop131—also had the highest stringency values on the WRLURI.132 Saiz found 
that regions with the most inelastic supply are also the most geographically 
constrained in terms of mountainous topography and internal water (e.g., flood 
plains, wetlands).133 Areas with the most geographic constraints also had the 
highest stringency values on the WRLURI.134 Housing and population growth were 
also predictive of more stringent regulation.135 Though this does not establish 
causality, Saiz’s results evoke the homevoter hypothesis, suggesting that people 
who invest in expensive high growth areas want more regulation to retain value in 
their investment.136  
 
128. In an effort to drive down housing costs, the California legislature has aimed to 
reduce the number of local regulations for certain types of residential developments. SB 35 
requires local jurisdictions not in compliance with RHNA obligations to approve certain 
residential developments containing ten to fifty percent affordable housing through a 
ministerial process. S.B. 35, 2017–2018 Reg., Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). SB 827—which would 
have created a by-right process to approve residential developments exceeding underlying 
height limitations in transit zones—failed last year; however, the bill will likely be 
resurrected in some form during the next legislative cycle. See Alissa Walker, Sen. Scott 
Wiener Will Introduce New Version of Transit Density Bill, CURBED LA (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/R5KK-S4HP.  
129. See e.g., Michael C. Lens & Paavo Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations 
Make Metropolitan Areas More Segregated by Income? 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 11 (2016) 
(using the WRLURI to analyze levels of spatial segregation); Albert Saiz, The Geographic 
Determinants of Housing Supply, 125 Q. J. ECON. 1253 (2010) (using the WRLURI to 
analyze geographic constraints and housing supply restrictions); Matthew A. Turner, 
Andrew Haughwout & Wilber van der Klaauw, Land Use Regulation and Welfare, 82 
ECONOMETRICA 1341 (2014) (using the WRLURI to gauge supply constraints). 
130. See e.g., QUIGLEY, RAPHAEL & ROSENTHAL, supra note 14, at 280; Kristoffer 
Jackson, Regulation, Land Constraints, and California’s Boom and Bust, 68 REGIONAL SCI. 
& URB. ECON. 130 (2018); Terner Center, Terner Residential Land Use Survey (on file with 
the author).  
131. To determine what land is unavailable, Saiz used satellite data to calculate areas 
lost due to water and mountains (any slope above fifteen percent). Saiz, supra note 129, at 
1254. 
132. Id. at 1282. 
133. Id. at 1253. 
134. Id. at 1261. 
135. Id. at 1282. 
136. Albert Saiz, The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply, 125 Q. J. ECON. 
1253 (2010), at 1255. 
1_BIBER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018  10:21 AM 
 O’Neill, Gualco-Nelson, Biber, 2019 
 
25 
 
A few key limitations of the WRLUI study make reliance on that study 
problematic. First, the authors assign stringency variables to metropolitan 
statistical areas (“MSAs”).137 This index tells us that San Francisco was more 
highly regulated than the national average.138 But the stringency level for San 
Francisco, for example, is composed of thirteen observations drawn from five 
counties. The stringency value might not necessarily characterize the regulatory 
process across those five counties. Second, the WRLURI only focuses on the 
approval process in theory. This approach is ill-suited to understanding and 
distinguishing drivers of delays that could be related to local variations in planning 
practice rather than what the law mandates. Third, the WRLURI identifies 
stringency at a single point in time in 2005. Using the data (or findings) to describe 
current conditions risks ignoring changes in the regulatory process that occurred 
after the point in time of the survey or data collection.139 Fourth, the sub-index 
values derive from inherently subjective survey questions submitted to only one 
planning official per jurisdiction; the bias or perspective of a single person could 
substantially skew the stringency measurement.140 Finally, although areas with the 
most stringent regulation have the highest housing costs, all regulations might not 
impact that cost in the same way.  
 
b. Exploring stringency and constraints on housing supply through a 
statewide or regional survey 
 
National surveys provide a big picture of the regulatory environment 
across the country, but regional and statewide surveys may more effectively 
identify the regulatory determinants of housing inelasticity,141 and are necessary to 
understand how land use affects housing supply given the local and heterogeneous 
nature of land use regulation.142 Local metropolitan surveys require more resources 
than a national survey, and “the enormity of [this] effort prevents it from being 
easily replicated in many . . . markets.”143 California has benefited from at least 
five regional and state-specific studies.144 
 
137. Gyourko, Saiz & Summers, supra note 113, at 713.  
138. Id. at 714 (finding that the least regulated jurisdictions were located within the 
Midwest, whereas the most regulated jurisdictions were in the coastal metro areas, with the 
most stringent land use systems located in the North East). 
139. See Been, supra note 89, at 227 for a similar argument.  
140. The potential for these types of biases is further explained in the context of 
CEQA in LANDIS, PENDALL, OLSHANKSY & HUANG, supra note 42, at 116. The authors note 
that planners’ “livelihoods depend in no small part on administering [CEQA].”  
141. Glaeser & Ward 2008, for example, used a highly resource-intensive method 
that enabled them to disaggregate minimum lot sizes, wetlands, and infrastructure regulation 
as the major determinants of permitting and costs in the Boston metro area. Edward L. 
Glaeser & Bryce Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulation: Evidence 
from Greater Boston, 65 J. OF URB. ECON. 265 (2008). 
142. GYOURKO & MOLLOY, supra note 89, at 13. 
143. Id.  
144. We omit discussion of several earlier California focused surveys conducted in 
1989 (MADELYN GLICKFELD AND NED LEVINE, REGIONAL GROWTH AND LOCAL REACTION: 
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Quigley, Raphael & Rosenthal 2009 used a method similar to WRLURI 
to create a regulatory stringency index for the San Francisco Bay Area. The authors 
surveyed building officials in eighty-six jurisdictions in 2007, and then 
supplemented their data with surveys of land use officials conducted between 
1992–1999.145 The 2007 survey addressed a variety of factors that affect housing 
development, including duration, timing, specific regulations, political influence, 
project approval procedures, delays, inclusionary zoning, and open space.146 
Building officials provided information on the number of approvals required for 
certain types of projects and the presence of certain types of regulation connected 
to restricted growth.147 They also conducted online surveys of professional builders 
and environmental consultants, who provided self-reported data on a total of 37 
single-family (121 units) and 25 mixed-use developments (331 units) in 33 land 
use jurisdictions.148 These questions asked about “perceived level of controversy” 
associated with certain project types, “regulatory reasonableness,” “transparency,” 
and “estimates [of] the ‘all-inclusive cost of the entire entitlement process.”149 
Indexing the results of both surveys, the authors created the Berkeley Land Use 
Regulation Index (“BLURI”).150  
The BLURI does not necessarily contradict the findings of the WRLURI, 
but highlights that local context is important when assessing land use regulation in 
California. The BLURI indicated that the average approval lag between application 
and permit was 2 years for a multifamily development and 2.5 years for a single-
family home development.151 Within this time frame, environmental approvals 
took 2.3 years for single-family homes and 1.9 years for multifamily.152 
Other findings from the BLURI closely track the WRLURI. The numbers 
of approvals required to build a unit of housing closely correlated with high 
housing costs.153 Regulatory stringency was consistently associated with higher 
costs for construction, longer delays in completing projects, and greater uncertainty 
about the elapsed time to completion of residential developments.154 Political 
 
THE ENACTMENT AND EFFECTS OF LOCAL GROWTH CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES 
IN CALIFORNIA (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy ed., 1992)) and 1992 (Ned 
Levine, Madelyn Glickfeld & William Fulton, Home Rule: Local Growth Control. Regional 
Consequences, (Report to the Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. & the S. Cal. Ass’n of Gov’ts 
1996) (unpublished)).  
145. John Quigley, Steven Raphael & Larry A. Rosenthal, Measuring Land Use 
Regulations and Their Effects in the Housing Market, HOUSING MARKETS AND THE 
ECONOMY 272, 280 (Lincoln Institute of Land and Policy ed., 2009). For the 1992–1999 
surveys, see Glickfield & Levine, supra note 13; Ned Levine, The effects of local growth 
controls on regional housing production and population redistribution in California, 36 
URB. STUD. 2047 (1999).  
146. Quigley, Raphael & Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 280. 
147. Id. at 282–85. 
148. Quigley, Raphael & Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 287–289. 
149. Id. at 288–89. 
150. Id. at 289. 
151. Id. at 292. 
152. Id. at 292–93. 
153. Quigley, Raphael & Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 295. 
154. Id. at 297. 
1_BIBER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018  10:21 AM 
 O’Neill, Gualco-Nelson, Biber, 2019 
 
27 
 
influence was another important factor, with jurisdictions in Marin County, the 
City of Richmond, and the consolidated City and County of San Francisco 
reporting the strongest political influence.155 Berkeley and mixed-income cities 
like San Jose and Vallejo ranked in the middle in terms of political influence.156 
Another more recent California-focused survey includes the California 
Land Use Regulatory Index (“CaLURI”). The CaLURI provides better insight into 
the geographic variability of land use stringency across California. Jackson sent 
surveys to planning staff in 540 cities and counties, and 420 jurisdictions 
responded.157 The survey asked questions about the land use process and policies, 
including specific residential development standards like bulk, height, setback 
requirements, and floor area ratio restrictions.158 The survey also asked whether 
the jurisdiction permitted low-cost housing alternatives, like mobile homes, as well 
as whether the jurisdiction restricts growth through its General Plan.159 Other 
questions asked about affordable housing requirements, average approval times, 
permit caps, and planners’ perceptions of the groups that wield the most political 
influence, as well as the main drivers of development regulation.160 Jackson 
aggregated the sub-indices to create a stringency measure for each responding 
jurisdiction.161  
Jackson found that the San Francisco Bay Area is the most stringently 
regulated region in California.162 Whereas Southern California is more likely to 
restrict the form of new development, the Bay Area tends to prohibit development 
outright.163 Notably, Jackson also found that the variation in regulatory stringency 
between coastal and inland communities was not statistically significant.164 One 
major variation between coastal and inland communities is affordable housing 
mandates and low-cost housing alternatives. Coastal jurisdictions, where housing 
is the most expensive, are more likely to have affordable housing mandates and are 
more likely to permit mobile home parks than inland communities.165 Jackson also 
found that contrary to previous studies, regulatory stringency is not a proxy for 
supply elasticity.166 Instead geographic constraints are a more appropriate proxy.167  
 
 
155. Quigley, Raphael & Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 297. 
156. Id. 
157. Jackson, supra note 130, at 131. The responding jurisdictions comprised more 
than ninety percent of California’s population. 
158. Id. at 133.  
159. Id. at 142.  
160. Id. at 143.  
161. Id. at 132.  
162. Jackson, supra note 130, at 133.  
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 134. 
165. Id. at 145. 
166. Jackson, supra note 130, at 141. 
167. Id. Note that unlike Saiz who used GIS tools to measure geographic constraints, 
Jackson relies on planner’s identification of “land supply” as a primary driver of land use 
regulation in the survey instrument. 
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c. Exploring supply constraints through the case study approach 
 
Surveys focused within metropolitan regions or a single state may more 
effectively pinpoint the actual regulations that might constrain supply than national 
surveys. But even localized surveys cannot easily evaluate how laws are 
implemented at a project level. Mixed method case studies offer more insight. John 
Landis’s 2000 report for the Department of Housing and Community Development 
(“HCD Landis Report”) illustrates the value of case studies to explore land use 
regulations and residential development in California. 
The HCD Landis Report is comprised of a case study of 46 housing 
developments approved between 1995-1997 in 31 cities and counties.168 The 
authors selected the jurisdictions based on shared strong demand for housing, 
policies that were not anti-growth, and extensive experience processing high 
volumes of development applications.169 The authors sent surveys to these pre-
selected jurisdictions asking planners to identify a “typical” development in their 
community.170 The authors next traveled to the community, reviewed and copied 
the case file for the typical development, sent the case file to the developer to make 
any needed corrections, and conducted in-person interviews to supplement any 
gaps in information.171  
Landis found that the average approval time for the 24 single-family home 
case studies was 11 months, with each project subject to an average of 3.3 
reviews.172 For multifamily units, this timeline shrunk to 6.7 months, with only 2.3 
separate reviews.173 One of these reviews was typically non-legislative—meaning 
the approval did not require a rezoning or a General Plan Amendment—such as 
design review or approval by a neighborhood group.  
Notably, this work explored the role of CEQA on lag times.174 Some 
results were unsurprising. For example, the type of CEQA review directly 
coincided with approval timeline, with average delays of three years and twelve 
continuances for EIRs.175 But other results were surprising. Of the twenty-two 
 
168. JOHN D. LANDIS ET AL., RAISING THE ROOF: CALIFORNIA HOUSING 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 1997–2020, 95–96 (Cal. Dep’t of Housing 
and Cmty. Dev. ed., 2000). 
169. Id.  
170. LANDIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 95. The authors specified a typical project in 
their survey instrument as: single or multi-family projects larger than 25 units; projects for 
which the review process had been fully completed; and projects that had experienced a 
typical approval process. 
171. Id. at 96. 
172. Id. at 101. The authors define ‘review’ as “the number of separate discretionary 
actions by the local planning commission, city council (or board of supervisors) or any other 
. . . review body, such as a design review board.” 
173. Id. at 107. 
174. Landis had specifically explored the role of CEQA in earlier work. See LANDIS, 
PENDALL, OLSHANSKY & HUANG, supra note 42.  
175. LANDIS ET AL., supra note 168, at 102. For a discussion of CEQA review, see 
Part I.A.2 supra. 
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multi-family case studies, only one project had to conduct an EIR.176 Eight projects 
received NDs, six received MNDs, and six projects were processed under a tiered 
EIR from a prior Specific Plan.177 In contrast, three single-family home projects 
conducted an EIR, twelve projects used a tiered EIR, and eight projects were issued 
NDs and MNDs.178  
This study’s CEQA results have interesting implications for the overall 
planning process. A third of multifamily projects were processed under a Specific 
Plan, compared to two-thirds of single-family homes that went through the Planned 
Unit Development (“PUD”) process.179 The difference in approval times suggests 
that Specific Plans can significantly cut down on approval delays, although single-
family home PUDs were approved much faster than re-zones or General Plan 
Amendments.180 The case studies also suggested that certain jurisdictions were not 
complying with the California Permit Streamlining Act (Cal. Gov. Code § 65950 
et seq.), which required all jurisdictions—including charter cities181—to approve 
projects within certain time windows.182  
Development selection for this case study limits the capacity for 
generalizations from the findings. First, the authors selected the jurisdictions based 
on their openness to new development, which likely skews the approval timeline, 
causing it to appear shorter. Second, the individual project case studies themselves 
were selected by local planners, who could import certain biases into the projects 
they recommend for analysis. Third, the study only looked at one project in each 
jurisdiction, limiting the ability to assess variance around the “typical” project. 
Although the data is over twenty years old, and the contemporary 
development climate has drastically changed in the intervening years, the 
McKinsey Global Institute recently used the HCD Landis Report to predict the 
 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. Planned Unit Development (PUD) in California refers to a zoning 
classification and a type of development that is intended to provide cities a degree of 
flexibility not typical of “conventional” zoning by, for example, permitting development of 
differing form and uses on a single or associated parcels. The definition and operation of the 
PUD will vary considerably depending on the city and local ordinance. See KOSTKA, supra 
note 19, § 7.40. The cities we studied, discussed in Parts II, III and IV, illustrate its diverse 
meaning at the local level. A PUD in San Jose, for example, always requires a re-zoning 
followed by a second permit that solidifies the design requirements. SAN JOSE MUN. CODE 
§ 20.120.110 (2013). PUDs in Palo Alto—called Planned Community Districts—also 
require a rezoning but not a subsequent permit. See PALO ALTO MUN. CODE § 18.38.065 
(2014). But a Planned Unit Development in Oakland, San Francisco, and Redwood City 
operates much more like a conditional use permit. See S.F. MUN. CODE § 304; REDWOOD 
CITY MUN. CODE §§ 46.1–46.7 (2005); OAKLAND MUN. CODE § 17.142.004.  
180. LANDIS ET AL., supra note 168, at 102. 
181. CAL GOV’T CODE § 65921 (1977). 
182. LANDIS ET AL., supra note 168, at 108–09. For example, Negative Declarations 
must be adopted within 180 days from when the project application is accepted as complete, 
with certain extensions acceptable for applicant delays. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151.5 
(1997); CEQA GUIDELINES § 15107 (2010). A Final EIR must be certified within one year 
of the project application’s acceptance as complete. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6595 (1985). 
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costs of current land use approval processes and the monetary benefits of reform.183 
Basing these projections on the HCD Landis Report as well as undisclosed expert 
interviews, McKinsey estimated the current approvals process at six months for 
simple projects and more than three years for complex projects.184 The McKinsey 
study found that shortening the approval process in California could reduce the 
cost of housing by more than $12 billion through 2025 and accelerate project 
approvals by an average of four months.185 The most significant gains of improving 
land use processes would accrue to projects that require a zoning change or a 
General Plan Amendment and projects that require an EIR.186 Savings to projects 
undergoing streamlining under a Specific Plan are minimal, indirectly suggesting 
that streamlined approval processes are working efficiently.187 McKinsey likely 
drew those last conclusions directly from Landis’s study, which found that 
amongst the case study projects, use of long-term planning like Specific Plans 
reduces delay.188 These results suggest that jurisdictions should consider investing 
in Specific Plans that enable streamlined review for discretionary projects and/or 
ministerial approvals.189 These results also suggest that land use regulations may 
be stringent but still efficient in terms of approval times when there is a 
comprehensive plan for future growth in place. 
Remarkably, although developers frequently refer to CEQA as “the third 
rail of California politics,”190 current empirical research into how CEQA constrains 
supply continues to be fairly limited. The California Legislative Analyst’s Office 
(“LAO”) has identified CEQA as a culprit in delaying or reducing residential 
construction in the state.191 The LAO conducted an independent review of CEQA 
documents submitted to the state between 2004-2013 and found that agencies took 
2.5 years to approve a project-specific EIR.192 While this figure includes non-
residential projects that could potentially provoke more controversy, it is not 
inconsistent with the findings of the BLURI survey. But as noted in the Landis 
 
183. See e.g., Jan Mischke et al., A Tool Kit to Close California’s Housing Gap: 3.5 
Million Homes by 2025, MCKINSEY & COMPANY 28–29 (Oct. 2016); CAL. DEPT. HOUSING 
& CMTY. DEV., CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING FUTURE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2017).  
184. MISCHKE ET AL., supra note 183, at 28. The report does not define a simple or 
complex project. 
185. Id. at vi.  
186. Id. at 28–29 (2016) (finding that improving approvals for zoning or general plan 
amendment projects would reduce the timeline from 9 to 6 months, or about thirty-three 
percent. Improving the process for EIRs would reduce the timeline from 21 to 15 months, 
or about thirty percent). McKinsey also used undisclosed expert interviews in reaching these 
conclusions. See id. at 28.  
187. Id. at 28–29. 
188. LANDIS ET AL., supra note 168, at 110 (“[T]wo-thirds of the single-family case 
studies were processed as part of a pre-approved specific, community, or area plan . . . . 
[F]or many of the reviewed projects, the most onerous, time-consuming, and controversial 
part of the development approvals process had already been completed.”) 
189. MISCHKE ET AL., supra note 183, at 29–30. 
190. Bill Allen & Maura O’Connor, CEQA: That 70’s Law, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 
2011), https://perma.cc/9GS9-VVWK. 
191. See LAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 15. 
192. Id. at 18. 
1_BIBER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018  10:21 AM 
 O’Neill, Gualco-Nelson, Biber, 2019 
 
31 
 
study and as discussed below, an EIR is not the only CEQA outcome.193 In 2016, 
BAE Economics published a study that concluded that no evidence supported 
arguments that CEQA was a barrier to development (defined to include more than 
housing), examining four development projects involving environmental review 
and finding that direct environmental review costs ranged from .025 to .05% of 
total project costs.194 
In summary, the relevant research on the relationship between regulation 
and housing costs has found a strong connection, but that research has relied on 
inferences drawn from the gap between construction costs and sales prices or on 
surveys of planners and other stakeholders about their understanding of the 
regulatory process. While some research uses mixed method case studies, the 
methods still limit generalizability. Overall, the research has also found 
correlations between high-income levels and property values with regulation, 
significant variation across jurisdictions in terms of regulatory frameworks and 
stringency, high levels of complexity in the land-use regulatory process, and 
possible benefits for facilitating approvals through the use of specific or 
neighborhood-level planning processes. 
 
2. Understanding land use regulation as a tool of exclusion 
 
Another important line of research examines whether stringency in land 
use regulation is associated with racial and/or economic exclusion, which in turn 
can contribute to spatial inequality.195 For example, using income and racial 
segregation data and the Pendall 2006 land use survey, Rothwell and Massey in 
2010 found a strong relationship between density and income segregation.196 The 
higher a metropolitan area’s density score, the lower the degree of class 
segregation.197 These findings support the exclusionary suburb paradigm, in which 
wealthy suburbs use zoning to maintain low-density development that effectively 
excludes low-income people and minorities.198  
 
193. MISCHKE ET AL., supra note 183, at 28–39. 
194. Janet Smith-Heimer et al., CEQA in the 21st Century, ROSE FOUND. FOR 
COMMUNITIES & THE ENV’T (2016). 
195. We define spatial inequality to refer to scholarly work that finds that where a 
person lives may limit a person’s access to economic, educational, and quality housing 
opportunities, and may impact health and life outcomes. This incorporates research that 
explores racial residential segregation, exclusion, and gentrification. 
196. Jonathan T. Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, Density Zoning and Class 
Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 1123, 1123 (2010). 
197. Id. 
198. See John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 
n.2 (2014). (“Decades of scholarship—legal and sociological—outline how these policies 
left low-income families stranded in faltering cities whose abandonment by suburban 
homeowners-to-be at least left behind a large supply of low-cost housing”) (citing FISCHEL, 
supra note 92); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth 
Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 385, n.3 (1977); see also S. 
Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 
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Spatial inequality, however, is not limited to exclusive suburbs within 
metropolitan areas. Gentrification within central cities, for example, is associated 
with segregation, exclusion, discrimination,199 and the displacement of low-income 
communities.200 Discussing spatial inequality thus requires consideration of 
exclusionary strong-market cities201 and the growing suburbanization of the 
poor.202 One theory (built on prior legal and economic studies) about exclusionary 
zoning within the strong market central city might explain the persistence of spatial 
inequality as more affluent populations move into formerly low-income 
neighborhoods: Demand for development controls increases as cities become 
denser and richer, evidenced by the tightening of development controls as affluent 
individuals return to cities, reversing decades of urban flight. 203 Gentrification, 
under this theory, would stem from the gradual tightening of restrictions that reflect 
the preferences of newly arrived affluent urban workers who prefer wealthier 
established neighborhoods that disallow new development and who flock to the 
lower-income neighborhoods adjacent to these wealthy anti-development areas, 
driving up the rents and disrupting the normal filtering process.204 This theory of 
 
1983); S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d. 
713 (N.J. 1975). See also BEEN, supra note 89, at 218. 
199. See generally john powell, Sprawl, Fragmentation, and the Persistence of 
Racial Inequality, in URBAN SPRAWL: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES, 
104–15 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2002); Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammel, Gentrification, 
Segregation, and Discrimination in the American Urban System, 36 ENV’T AND PLAN. A, 
1215–39 (2004) (finding evidence of intensified discrimination in lending and exclusion in 
gentrified neighborhoods).  
200. See The Urban Displacement Project, Executive Summary (2015) (using 
statistical analysis of demographic and land use datasets to find that “more than half of low-
income households, all over the nine-county region, live in neighborhoods at risk of or 
already experiencing displacement”); but see Lance Freeman, Displacement or Succession, 
40 URB. AFF. REV. 463, 467 (2005) (using longitudinal survey data to find that “there is 
relatively little in the way of persuasive empirical evidence that suggests [that displacement] 
is indeed how gentrifying neighborhoods change”) 
201. See HUTSON, supra note 87, at 13–14; Been, supra note 89, at 219–23 
(discussing the scholarly works exploring exclusionary zoning within cities); MANGIN, 
supra note 197.  
202. Elizbeth Kneebone & Emily Garr, The Suburbanization of Poverty: Trends in 
Metropolitan America, 2000 to 2008, BROOKINGS INST. (2010) (finding that “while poverty 
has grown on the whole, the most recent data also make clear that American poverty is 
becoming an increasingly suburban phenomenon”).  
203. MANGIN, supra note 198, at 92.  
204. Id. at 95. Filtering is a theory based on supply-side solutions to the inadequate 
supply of affordable housing stock, in which the construction of middle- to upper-quality 
housing stock opens up opportunities for lower-quality housing stock as middle to upper-
income households occupy better housing. See William C. Baer & Christopher B. 
Williamson, The Filtering of Households and Housing Units, 3 J. OF PLAN. LITERATURE 127, 
128–29 (1988). However, economists have noted that filtering may be an inefficient tool to 
support increased housing for low-income households in markets with high development 
costs. In such contexts, any gains in affordable housing stock might be accompanied by 
harms associated with downgrading and abandonment of neighborhood environments 
providing the low-income housing stock. See Galster & Rothenberg, Filtering in Urban 
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exclusionary zoning in central cities influences current legal research in this 
arena.205 
Based on this theoretical framework, by opposing market-rate 
development in their neighborhoods and rejecting a supply-side solution to the 
gentrification problem, some anti-gentrification advocates, community 
development, and affordable housing practitioners may be working against their 
own interests.206 The author did not propose inclusionary housing incentives as a 
response to the exclusionary zoning within the central city but suggested reducing 
regulation incrementally—particularly aesthetic and historical preservation.207 
Easing local control over land use and supporting a supply-side solution (even for 
market-rate development) to gentrification and displacement is a dominant theme 
in California’s public policy debate and public discourse about potential solutions 
to the housing crisis, but it is not without controversy.208  
For some, the term “exclusionary zoning” suggests that the remedy would 
be more permissive density. But a 2015 study suggests a more complex problem.209 
Comparing land use stringency data from the WRLURI survey with a segregation 
index, Lens and Monkkonen found that the overall WRLURI score—a 
measurement of local regulatory stringency—did not correlate with income 
segregation, which suggests that not all land use regulations contribute to class 
 
Housing: A Graphical Analysis of a Quality-Segmented Market, 11 J. OF PLAN., EDUC. & 
RES. 37, 48–49 (1991).  
205. See e.g., Been, supra note 89, at 222; Wendall Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, 
Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 34 (2018) (forthcoming).  
206. See MANGIN, supra note 198, at 93–94. Others have made similar arguments 
but acknowledge the methodological challenges of determining whether increasing supply 
contributes to increased housing costs. See Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine 
O’Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and Affordability, NYU FURMAN CTR (Draft 
Oct. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/YDU7-PJNX; see also Been, supra note 89, at 244–45.  
207. MANGIN, supra note 198, at 119–20. 
208. The Yes In My Backyard (YIMBY) movement is an example. See Let’s End 
California’s Housing Crisis: Support SB 827 – Sen. Wiener’s Transit Rich Housing Bonus 
Bill, CAL. YIMBY (Oct. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/J5LA-3G6A; see also LAO REPORT, 
supra note 5 (using data from The Displacement Project to conclude that increasing supply 
of market-rate housing would curtail displacement of low-income households); but see 
Miriam Zuk & Karen Chapple, Housing Production, Filtering and Displacement: 
Untangling the Relationships, BERKELEY IGS RES. BRIEF (May 2016), https://perma.c 
c/SJX5-YP3S (responding to this report and offering a more nuanced analysis: the data 
showed market-rate and subsidized housing reduce displacement pressures at the regional 
level, but not at the block level, at least not in San Francisco, and that market-rate production 
is associated with higher housing costs for low-income households, but lower median rents, 
in subsequent decades). See also Miriam Zuk, Ian Carlton, & Anna Cash, SB 827 2.0, What 
are the implications for communities in the Bay Area? THE URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT 
(Oct. 1, 2018) https://perma.cc/3H9A-AJKT (finding that the SB-827 proposal, to reduce 
discretionary review of certain types of infill development near transit, would have resulted 
in a six-fold increase in feasibility of market-rate housing in affluent areas, and a seven-fold 
increase in inclusionary housing in moderate income areas, but that 60% of the financially 
feasible development was located in gentrifying or low-income areas, and over 65% of 
residential demolitions for development would have occurred in these neighborhoods). 
209. LENS & MONKKONEN, supra note 129, at 12.  
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segregation.210 Density restrictions are strongly correlated with income segregation 
and seclusion of the super elite.211 But the correlation was equally strong for 
jurisdictions that mandated high minimum densities as well as those that kept 
densities low.212 Understood within the context of the Rothwell & Massey work, 
this suggests that other restrictive forces are at play even in areas with permissive 
density—like central cities. Notably, income segregation is higher where local 
governments are more involved in entitlement approvals and communities put 
more pressure on the government to control growth213 and lower in places with a 
higher degree of state involvement in local planning decisions.214 Jurisdictions that 
require multiple levels of government approvals to build are more segregated.215 
Finally, the authors observed higher levels of income segregation in MSAs with 
central cities that regulate land use more stringently than surrounding suburbs.216 
The authors concluded that inclusionary incentives and reduced local control might 
be the most effective at reducing segregation.217 
There is little research that aims to identify which land use regulations 
may be contributing to exclusion within cities generally, and insufficient recent 
research that focuses specifically on California.218 There are two recent reports that 
explore the role of CEQA litigation as a tool to block infill development, although 
both examine CEQA’s impact on more than housing development. In 2015, the 
law firm Holland & Knight produced a widely circulated report analyzing all 
CEQA lawsuits filed within a fifteen-year period and found that eighty percent of 
CEQA litigation in the past fifteen years targeted infill development.219 While 
scholars have criticized this report for its overly inclusive definition of infill 
development,220 this observation finds some support in earlier studies that found 
most CEQA litigation to occur in large cities.221 Although it does not focus 
 
210. Id. at 11.  
211. Id.  
212. Id. at 11–12.  
213. LENS & MONKKONEN, supra note 129, at 12.  
214. Id.  
215. Id.  
216. Id.  
217. Id. at 11–12. 
218. Anika Singh Lemar, Zoning as Taxidermy: Neighborhood Conservation 
Districts and the Regulation of Aesthetics, 90 IND. L. J. 1525, 1563 (2015). Lemar, for 
example, explored the use of aesthetic regulations within walkable “conservation 
neighborhoods” with close proximity to the urban center and transit—specifically 
conservation districts— to constrain supply, but none within California. Lemar posits that 
urban residents are using conservation districts as a new public law form of private 
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (“CC&Rs”)—a hypothesis she finds support for in 
factual findings from published state opinions. Unlike CC&Rs, however, which must be 
adopted unanimously, a vocal minority of the neighborhood can organize to form a 
conservation district.  
219. Jennifer Hernandez, David Friedman & Stephanie DeHerrera, In the Name of 
the Environment, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (2015). 
220. See Sean Hecht, Anti-CEQA Lobbyists Turn to Empirical Analysis, but are 
Their Conclusions Sound?, LEGAL PLANT (Sept. 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/B7P3-7MB8. 
221. See LANDIS, PENDALL, OLSHANSKY & HUANG, supra note 42, at 110–11 (1995). 
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exclusively on housing development, it appears consistent with the observations of 
Mangin 2014 and Lens & Monkkonen 2016 that dense cities are using land use 
regulation as an exclusionary tactic. The 2016 report from BAE Economics, 
however, found low rates of litigation and infrequent use of EIRs.222 
 
C. How the limits of past research make it challenging to 
inform proposed legal reform 
 
Past research tells us that stringency in land use regulation is correlated 
with certain outcomes—be it reduced housing supply and increased housing costs, 
or increased income segregation and spatial inequality. But it does not establish 
causation, nor does it identify which land use regulations, specifically, are 
correlated with these outcomes. It may be that increasing housing supply across 
multiple income levels or redressing spatial inequality within our urban 
communities is not as simple as drastically reducing regulation. And yet proposed 
legal reforms continue to target process, advancing solutions like reducing the 
number of approvals, more state oversight over local zoning decisions,223 and 
CEQA reform.224 Each of these elements of process serve important goals, like 
open government, public participation, and disclosure and mitigation of potential 
environmental harms. If we are uncertain which element of process increases 
 
222. See JANET SMITH-HEIMER ET AL., supra note 194. A much earlier study used a 
survey and found that responses indicated CEQA litigation is relatively rare, with fifty-eight 
percent of the responding communities reporting no CEQA litigation between 1985-1990. 
See LANDIS, PENDALL, OLSHANSKY & HUANG, supra note 42, at 90. Eighty percent of 
jurisdictions reported zero or one lawsuits within that five-year timeframe. The authors 
estimated that across California, there is one lawsuit per 354 CEQA reviews. Attempts to 
find demographic variables driving the variation across communities were unsuccessful; the 
only statistically significant correlation showed that CEQA litigation is more common in 
larger cities, in white-majority cities, and in Democratic-majority cities. But this data 
predates recent CEQA streamlining initiatives as well as case law that made business, rather 
than environmental interests, easier to leverage. See e.g., Save the Plastic Bag Coalition 254 
P.3d at 1011-12 where the California Supreme Court refused to apply the federal “zone of 
interests” test for CEQA litigation. 
223. For example, decisions at the state-level—although perhaps less biased towards 
local political power players—could take much longer than decisions at the local level. See 
e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 276 (regional governance structures in Oregon and 
Washington have had mixed results, and New Jersey Mt. Laurel Fair Share requirements 
have failed to yield integrated demographic mixes). Research shows that Massachusetts 
Chapter 40B has been effective, although it is difficult to disentangle the coercive threat of 
state action with local incentives to construct affordable housing. See Carolina K. Reid, 
Carol Gallante & Ashley F. Weinstein-Carnes, Borrowing Innovation, Achieving 
Affordability: What We Can Learn from Massachusetts Chapter 40B, TERNER CTR. FOR 
HOUSING INNOVATION (2016). 
224. See Dan Walters, Brown Talks CEQA Reform, but Hasn’t Done It, 
CALMATTERS (Aug. 2, 2018) https://perma.cc/EF2X-VD2Y (discussing Governor Brown’s 
call for comprehensive CEQA reform). Moderate reforms have succeeded in the legislature. 
See e.g., A.B. 2341 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (reducing significance of certain 
aesthetic impacts); A.B. 2782 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (allowing an EIR to 
discuss non-environmental benefits of a proposed project). 
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housing costs, or exacerbates or contributes to segregation or gentrification, 
eliminating or curtailing process may sacrifice one set of policy goals without 
achieving another. 
The research showing that permissive density does not equate with spatial 
equality is particularly troubling for California. California’s signature housing 
legislation, the Housing Element of the General Plan, requires jurisdictions to plan 
for and zone for density to accommodate their portion of their regional housing 
need.225 In addition to well-noted problems, (for example, Housing Element law 
places no affirmative production requirement on the jurisdiction beyond re-
zonings),226 this model implicitly assumes that density is a proxy for 
affordability.227 As the most recent work around exclusionary central cities 
suggests, zoning for density does not necessarily result in opening up access to 
cities, as there are likely non-zoning barriers to development within exclusionary 
central cities.  
More inquiry into how the land use approval process plays out within 
individual cities is therefore necessary to implement effective state-level reform. 
In essence, we are grappling with a series of local problems that have regional and 
statewide implications. Unlike surveys that often depend on generalizations across 
multiple jurisdictions and necessarily depend on perceptions of the regulatory 
process by the surveyed stakeholders, case studies can effectively unpack the local 
variation and the potential impacts of specific regulations within these local 
contexts and ground-truth actual outcomes of land-use regulatory processes. And 
because land use planning has changed over the past twenty years, current data that 
reflects these changes is needed to explore these issues.  
 
Part II: Methods 
 
Crafting effective and targeted policy interventions to promote equitable 
infill development requires understanding what legal barriers to increased housing 
production exist; what legal tools afford meaningful participation in land use 
planning; and how current development patterns are affecting affordable housing 
opportunities within TOD areas or areas receiving substantial transit investment. 
Our study seeks to address these issues by examining whether local land use law 
and/or environmental regulations governing infill development individually, or in 
conjunction, present significant obstacles to equitable infill development. Based on 
our review of existing research (discussed in Part I) we hypothesized that: 
 
225. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65583 et seq. The affirmative rezoning obligation only 
applies, however, if a jurisdiction has failed to meet certain obligations—for example, by 
failing to zone for sufficient sites to meet its share of the Regional Housing Needs 
Assessment (RHNA) for the prior planning period. 
226. Paul G. Lewis, California’s Housing Element Law: The Issue of Local 
Noncompliance 10, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (2003).  
227. Id. (finding that “cities with significant housing unit goals are left with . . . 
rezoning existing neighborhoods for higher density housing”). 
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1. There are significant legal, planning, and regulatory barriers to advancing 
equitable infill development within transit-accessible neighborhoods in 
high cost coastal cities; 
2. The most significant barriers will emerge in local land use regulations that 
limit or slow infill development in transit-accessible neighborhoods and 
not in state environmental regulation; and, 
3. State law aimed at incentivizing infill development in transit-accessible 
neighborhoods is applied differently (and sometimes ineffectually) within 
these local contexts.  
Based in part on these descriptive hypotheses, we also began with a baseline 
hypothesis that future policies to advance state-level GHG reduction goals in a way 
that also promotes equitable infill development will require policy interventions 
that meet a number of important requirements, including (a) accounting for the 
heterogeneity of local regulations; (b) accounting for varied application of state 
streamlining provisions (or varied planning practice) in relationship to the political 
culture and revenue demands of the specific local context; and (c) either are (i) 
constructed at the local level to advance equitable infill development in transit-
accessible locations; or (ii) are carefully targeted approaches to reducing local 
discretion over proposed infill development in transit-accessible locations that 
nonetheless protect the voice of vulnerable communities, minimize or prevent 
displacement of existing low-income residents, and ensure access to transit for 
future low-income residents. To test our hypotheses, we employed a case study 
approach that joins qualitative228 and legal research methods, employing 
overlapping phases of data collection and sequenced analysis.229 
A. Choosing study sites: focusing first on the Bay Area 
 
Our first phase of research involved selecting strong market charter 
cities230 of various sizes within California major metropolitan areas (specifically, 
urban core cities and first ring suburban communities) experiencing robust 
 
228. See JOHN W. CRESWELL, RESEARCH DESIGN: QUALITATIVE, QUANTITATIVE, AND 
MIXED METHODS APPROACHES, 185-204 (Vicki Knight et al. eds., 4th ed. 2014). 
229. See ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS (SAGE 
Publications, Inc. 6th ed. 2014); BRUCE L. BERG & HOWARD LUNE, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 325 (Pearson ed., 8th ed. 2011).  
230. Charter cities within California enjoy some freedom to legislate at the local level 
over “municipal affairs” even if a conflict with state law may exist under Article XI, section 
5 of the California Constitution. Although the California Constitution does not expressly 
define “municipal affair,” land use and zoning are consistently classified as exempt from 
the planning and zoning provisions of the California Government Code, unless the city’s 
charter indicates otherwise. See e.g. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65803, 65860(d); City of Irvine, 
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 799–800. 
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economic growth. The cities also needed to have transit accessibility or have 
capacity for TOD231 and be in high demand.232 
We began our work within the Bay Area, with a focus on San Francisco 
and San Jose. In 2015, the California Legislative Analyst’s Office attributed high 
housing costs statewide in large part to the lack of housing supply in California’s 
coastal communities.233 This report identified the San Francisco-Metropolitan 
Division (“MD”) and the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara MSA as having the first 
and second highest housing costs in the state in 2015, respectively. Using American 
Community Survey data and California Department of Housing and Community 
Development’s State Income Limits for 2017, we selected additional cities within 
the San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward MSA and San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara 
MSA using multiple criteria, including: demographic criteria, (population size, 
average household income, percentage of the population living in poverty, and area 
median income), land area, and population density.234 To be considered for the 
study, each city needed a minimum population of 50,000 people and a minimum 
land area of 7 square miles.235  
We used California’s Regional Housing Need Allocation (“RHNA”)236 to 
steer us towards jurisdictions that have transportation and other infrastructure in 
place or planned, and can sustainably support increased housing supply237 
including infill development.238 All of our first five selected cities face acute 
 
231. PETER CALTHORPE, URBANISM IN THE AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Island Press 
ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
232. MALO HUTSON, supra note 87, at 20; PAUL KNOX & LINDA MCCARTHY, 
URBANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO URBAN GEOGRAPHY (Pearson, 3d 2012). 
233. LAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. 
234. Area Median Incomes, or AMI, are provided by California’s Department of 
Housing and Community Development State Income Limits, which provides income 
eligibility criteria for affordable housing programs. See generally, Memorandum from 
Jennifer Seeger, Assistant Deputy Director Division of Housing Policy Development to 
Interested Parties (June 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/T9EU-AK4E.  
235. Cities that are too small (in population or land area) may not provide enough 
data for any meaningful analysis. 
236. RHNA is a goal of housing production that each jurisdiction within the state is 
mandated to achieve through the local jurisdiction’s Housing Element of its General Plan. 
237. Senate Bill 375 mandates that each of the state’s 18 Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations develop a Sustainable Communities Strategy that links housing development 
with transportation investments. The Association of Bay Area Governments’ (ABAG) 
Regional Housing Need Plan: San Francisco Bay Area 2014-2022, states its RHNA 
allocation methodology complies with SB-375 because it uses factors that “aim to expand 
housing and transportation options; increase access to jobs, particularly for low-income 
workers; and promote housing growth in places with high quality services, such as parks 
and schools. . . . [with] a fair share distribution between large cities and medium cities with 
high job growth and transit access.” Regional Housing Need Plan for San Francisco Bay 
Area: 2014-2022, ASS’N OF BAY AREA GOV’TS at 3, https://perma.cc/B2V6-9UCP. 
238. We used the RHNA to identify areas with adequate infrastructure (or planned 
infrastructure) but are mindful of the potentially disparate racial impact of housing 
allocation. See Press Release, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, New Research 
Shows Racial Disparities in Bay Area Housing Allocation Methodology (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/VRL8-BWED. 
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affordability issues, and all cities have complex land use approvals processes that 
typify the type of “stringent” regulation called out by existing research. Our first 
five cities were San Francisco, San Jose, Oakland, Redwood City, and Palo Alto.239  
B. Analyzing the law: creating planning and development 
ordinance summaries 
 
We first researched local ordinances and planning code provisions most 
relevant to residential/mixed use development approvals, starting with the most 
macro planning tools (the General Plan) and then drilling down to the micro level 
(use and development controls). We created a summary of planning and 
development controls in each jurisdiction, including permitted and restricted uses, 
height limitations within specific neighborhoods, maximum commercial and 
residential density and lot coverage, minimum parking requirements, exactions, 
and other dedication requirements. We also identified and cataloged all 
characteristics of local processes that would appear to increase affordable housing 
supply within the city, or preserve existing affordable housing, including 
inclusionary housing ordinances, local referenda to generate affordable housing 
supply, rent stabilization ordinances, anti-demolition ordinances, and 
neighborhood planning that taps into state-level streamlining initiatives. This step 
also identified the extent of a jurisdiction’s “as of right” development—meaning 
development that does not require a discretionary permit from a local approval 
body. For the vast majority of developments that require a discretionary approval, 
these code summaries also helped identify general approaches to density and other 
building form controls that drive the discretionary approval process, the internal 
process for obtaining a building entitlement, and the extent to which cities use long 
term planning to expedite environmental review. These summaries informed 
development data collection, later analysis, and interview questions. 
 
C. Analyzing the projects: building the entitlement database 
 
After completing the planning code summary for a city, we built a 
database for each selected jurisdiction that allows us to analyze land use and 
environmental review requirements for residential developments along with 
important characteristics, such as time to entitlements completion and size. This 
process required an emergent design, and went through three iterations to address 
variation in data access across cities and newly available data. 
1. Defining five or more residential units 
 
We chose the five-unit threshold in order to capture projects that most 
impact California’s housing and climate goals. The five-unit threshold does not 
 
239. We limit our findings in this article to these five cities, but are currently 
completing research within Los Angeles, Long Beach, Pasadena, and Santa Monica. 
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capture scattered site single-family homes, duplexes, or accessory dwelling units 
that are not developed as part of a larger development project. These scattered 
developments move through entitlement differently; they do not consistently 
present the type of dense infill development that can be the subject of the policy or 
political debate, and likely warrant their own research study.240  
We have gathered data on single-family subdivisions or duplexes where 
they are part of a larger development that produces more than 5 units of housing 
because on net they are adding substantially more housing and density than what 
was there before (typically vacant or commercial land in our project years). This 
in turn, potentially advances housing supply and climate goals. For example, 
Oakland’s mini lot ordinance allows a developer to subdivide a single lot to create 
“mini” lots that would not otherwise satisfy minimum lot requirements.241 
Developers in our data years used this process frequently to subdivide a lot that 
would normally only permit one or two single-family homes to create five or more 
single-family homes. This is an important process that significantly densifies 
neighborhoods.  
We included all projects that contained an addition of five units to the 
housing stock. We did not net out demolished units from the new addition of units. 
Frequently, the exact number of units being demolished was not available, so for 
consistency, we chose to capture that the project would include demolition but 
disregard demolished units for the purposes of total unit count. For example, a 
proposal to demolish a duplex and replace it with a ten-unit building would be 
counted as ten units, not eight units, although we would also capture that the prior 
use was residential and involved demolition. If the proposal was to add five or 
more units to an existing residential development, we would not count the existing 
units in the total unit count. This would apply where there was a proposal to the 
convert commercial space to residential units in an existing mixed-use building, or 
build new units on a vacant portion of a residential site. These types of 
developments occurred infrequently in our database years. 
We defined residential units broadly, encompassing live-work spaces, 
single room occupancy hotels, deed-restricted affordable housing, and student 
housing. We did not include facilities for the elderly dedicated to providing 
medical care or hospice care. We also did not include residential facilities 
constructed by hospitals to house patients’ families. 
 
 
 
240. The entitlement processes for individual single-family homes and duplexes are 
quite different than for larger projects. Individual homes and accessory dwelling units go 
through more streamlined processes than larger developments, frequently because they 
don’t require the land divisions that a larger single-family subdivision would require. See 
infra Figure 4; see also S.B. 1069, 2015-2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); A.B. 2299, 2015-
2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (streamlining approval processes for accessory dwelling 
units). 
241. OAKLAND MUNI. CODE § 17.142.010. 
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2. Defining project years: 2014, 2015, and 2016 
 
We included projects that received all the entitlements necessary to file 
for a building permit in 2014, 2015, and 2016. Entitlement includes any 
discretionary planning approval, including subdivision approvals. 
We chose our project years in order to minimize impact from the Great 
Recession years, but many jurisdictions extended pre-Great Recession entitlements 
during our study years. We did not count entitlements that were extensions of prior 
approved projects in our database. Post-entitlement developer-initiated 
modifications present a related issue. Sometimes a developer will receive an 
entitlement and then seek to modify it months or years later. We do not include the 
modification in our time frame calculations because it may not be reflective of 
planning process or law, but instead external factors related to the developer. Some 
data related to the Great Recession impacts could not be excluded. San Jose 
frequently uses the PUD Process, which begins with a rezoning later follow by a 
Planned Development Permit. In some instances, the delay between the rezoning 
and the permit was many years. This might be related to the Great Recession, but 
without more data it was impossible to solely attribute the delay to economic 
circumstances.  
For appealed projects, we used the date of the original approval and not 
the date the project was upheld on appeal. Some jurisdictions have large appeals 
dockets and appeals are not always heard within a certain statutory timeframe. We 
wanted to ensure we were measuring the planning process, not how long it takes 
to schedule and hear an appeal. That being said, we are analyzing timeframes for 
appeals resolutions that will be forthcoming in future publications.  
For jurisdictions that bifurcate more than one project approval—San Jose 
for example—we use the earliest application date and the latest approval date to 
bookend the entire process. San Francisco also differs from the other Bay Area 
jurisdictions in two important respects. The San Francisco Planning Code gives the 
Planning Commission the power to hear an appeal of a building permit 
application.242 This process is known as Discretionary Review, and it was initiated 
for ten projects during our timeframe. Unlike the appeals process, Discretionary 
Review is internal to the approvals process in that it remains within the purview of 
the Planning Commission, as opposed to the Board of Supervisors or the Board of 
Appeals. The Planning Commission did not resolve Discretionary Review for six 
of these projects during our timeframe, which means none of them could have filed 
for a building permit in our project years. Thus, we could not include these projects 
in our final database. These projects are also small, 38 units on average, and highly 
unlikely to affect our overall data. Subdivision presents an additional issue. Unlike 
other jurisdictions that typically approve the Tentative Map (for both horizontal 
subdivision and condominium/airspace subdivision) concurrently with the 
underlying land use approvals, in San Francisco, we frequently observed Tentative 
Map approvals for condominiums that occurred months to years after the approval 
of the underlying entitlements. Unlike other jurisdictions where the Planning 
 
242. S.F. MUNI. CODE §§ 311(d); 312(e). 
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Department usually manages subdivision review, in San Francisco the Department 
of Public Works primarily manages the Tentative Map approval process.243 While 
Tentative Maps are an important part of the residential development process, we 
did not want to inflate planning approval timeframes due to factors outside the 
Planning Department’s control. Thus for San Francisco, we only included 
subdivision approvals necessary to pull a building permit (for example, lot merger 
or horizontal subdivision) and not condominium maps that can be approved after 
obtaining a building permit. While projects that obtained condominium maps 
figure in our total approval counts, they do not factor into our overall approval 
timeframes.  
San Francisco’s response to the dissolution of the Redevelopment 
Agencies in 2011 also creates a distinct entitlement path that differs from the other 
selected jurisdictions.244 San Francisco designated a successor agency—the Office 
of Community Investment and Infrastructure (“OCII”)—after the dissolution of the 
Redevelopment Agencies in 2011 to fulfill the former Redevelopment Agency’s 
outstanding obligations.245 These obligations include development in 
redevelopment areas like Mission Bay, Transbay, and Bayview Hunters Point.246 
This entity is legally distinct from the City of San Francisco.247 OCII approves the 
entitlement of new developments within these plan areas pursuant to protocols 
 
243. See S.F. Department of Public Works, Subdivision Regulations § IV(D)(2015) 
(describing that once Planning issues the CEQA determination, “the Director of Public 
Works shall approve, conditionally approve, or deny the application within 50 days . . . “). 
244. The Community Redevelopment Act gave local governments the authority to 
declare areas as blighted and in need of urban renewal, which enabled the city or county to 
distribute most of the growth in property tax revenue for the project area to the relevant 
Redevelopment Agencies as tax-increment revenues. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 
33020 et seq. In 2011, the California legislature dissolved the Redevelopment Agencies. See 
A.B. X126, 2011-2012 (Cal. 2011). Dissolution has severely constricted local governments’ 
ability to finance affordable housing. See Casey Blount et al., Redevelopment Agencies in 
California: History, Benefits, Excesses, and Closure 7 (Working Paper No. EMAD-2014-
01, 2014). https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/Redevelopment_WhitePaper.pdf 
(estimating a statewide average annual loss of 4,500 to 6,500 new affordable units). 
245. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 11-12 (Jan. 26, 2012) (resolution transferring 
Redevelopment assets to successor agency); San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 215-12 
(September 25, 2012) (resolution designating Office of Community Investment and 
Infrastructure as successor agency). 
246. See Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, Affordable Housing 
Production Report Fiscal Year 2016-2017 2, https://sfocii.org/sites/default/files/2017% 
20ANNUAL%20REPORT%20-%20FY%2016%20-17%20FINAL.pdf. Outstanding 
obligations include the major approved developments in Hunters Point 
Shipyard/Candlestick Point, Mission Bay North and South and Transbay; disposition of 
former Redevelopment assets; and ensuring the development of affordable housing in the 
major approved developments.  
247. See San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 215-12 §3 (September 25, 2012). 
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outlined in each plan area document.248 OCII also utilizes remaining tax increment 
funds within the plan areas to fund affordable housing development.249 
The OCII approval process differs from projects approved through the 
Planning Department. The process varies depending on the Redevelopment Area, 
but generally OCII in partnership with a horizontal developer—which can be a 
public or private entity—selects the vertical developer for each parcel within the 
plan area.250 Once the developer is selected, the developer submits a Basic Concept 
Plan that is responsive to the highly prescriptive design standards set forth in the 
area plan.251 After approval of Basic Concept Plan, the developer submits for 
Schematic Review, which the agency must approve within 45 days of its 
submission.252 In approving the schematic design, OCII makes CEQA 
determinations based on the master EIR for each Redevelopment Area.253 
 
248. See generally, San Francisco Office of Community Investment and 
Infrastructure, Mission Bay North Design Review and Document Approval Procedure, 
https://sfocii.org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/771-DRDAP%20MBN.pdf; San 
Francisco Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, Mission Bay South Design 
Review and Document Approval Procedure, https://sfocii.org/sites/default/files 
/FileCenter/Documents/772-DRDAP%20MBS.PDF.  
249. See Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, Affordable Housing 
Production Report Fiscal Year 2016-2017 2.  
250. A horizontal developer builds out all the required infrastructure for a 
development; the vertical developer constructs the improvements. See e.g., Transbay 
Redevelopment Project Implementation Agreement 3, https://sfocii.org/sites/default/files 
/FileCenter/Documents/4039-TB%20Implementation%20Agreement_5.2006Fully%20Exe 
cuted.pdf (“Under the Cooperative Agreement, City and Authority title to the State-Owned 
Parcels is subject to a deed restriction requiring that any such parcel may be sold for 
development only when” certain financial conditions are met); First Amendment to Mission 
Bay South Owner Participation Agreement (Feb. 17, 2004), https://sfocii.org/sites/default 
/files/FileCenter/Documents/4089-15%20MBS%20OPA%20 Amendments%201%262.pdf 
(detailing obligations of Redevelopment Agency and Master Developer for Mission Bay 
South).  
251. San Francisco Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, Mission 
Bay South Design Review and Document Approval Procedure 7-10; https://sfocii.org/ 
sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/772-DRDAP%20MBS.PDF. These prescriptive 
design standards are known as the “Design for Development.” 
252. See e.g., San Francisco Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, 
Mission Bay South Design Review and Document Approval Procedure 7-9, https://sfocii. 
org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/772-DRDAP%20MBS.PDF. 
253. San Francisco Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, Mission 
Bay South Design Review and Document Approval Procedure 3, https://sfocii 
.org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/772-DRDAP%20MBS.PDF. 
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OCII is approving a substantial number of units,254 including the majority 
of San Francisco’s affordable housing units.255 Our calculations in this paper do 
not include this process for several reasons. First, within our selected jurisdictions, 
no other successor agency is approving residential development entirely outside 
the jurisdiction’s Planning Department. Omitting this pipeline of units enables us 
to provide a comparison of planning and entitlement processes by type and number 
of approvals; the OCII process would be a standalone process within our analysis. 
Second, this process is slowly being discontinued. By law, successor agencies 
cannot continue beyond the current redevelopment plan areas; redevelopment 
dissolution law requires obligations to sunset once the outstanding obligations are 
fulfilled.256 Finally, these projects are not tracked within the Planning Department, 
and OCII has more limited data tracking than the Planning Department, so the type 
of data required to attempt analysis (in terms of number of total units entitled, 
number of approvals and timelines) is unavailable.257 OCII’s unique approval 
process will, however, be discussed in future publications as we continue to gather 
the required data, as it may be an example of expeditious approvals of affordable 
housing development that should be contemplated (even as redevelopment is being 
discontinued).  
Phased projects present an additional complexity for measuring project 
time frames. Most notably Oakland entitles many projects under a single master 
EIR and Development Agreement that is phased over many years; in some cases 
phased projects crossed decades. Prior to filing for a building permit for each 
phase, the developer must obtain final design review from the City. For these 
projects, we did not measure the entire process from the date of the application for 
the master EIR and Development Agreement because the project was intentionally 
designed to be phased. In other words, the delay is not a product of law or planning 
process but rather market economics. This is consistent with the way we measure 
 
254. See San Francisco Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, 
Transbay Neighborhood (Transbay Project Area), https://sfocii.org/sites/default/files/T 
B%20Project%20Area%20Summary%20Sheet%20010418.pdf (stating that the Transbay 
redevelopment plan will lead to 4,150 new housing units, 35% of which will be affordable); 
San Francisco Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, Bayview Hunters Point 
Redevelopment Projects and Rezoning FEIR Summary S-3, https://sfocii.org/sites/default/ 
files/ftp/uploadedfiles/Projects/BVHPFEIRSum.pdf (estimating 3,700 net new units in the 
Bayview plan area); See San Francisco Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, 
Mission Bay, https://sfocii.org/mission-bay (stating Mission Bay redevelopment area will 
produce 6,404 new housing units, 1,806 of which are affordable). 
255. See Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, Affordable Housing 
Production Report Fiscal Year 2016-2017 4 (noting that 552 funded affordable housing 
units and 51 inclusionary units were completed in fiscal year 2016-2017). 
256. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34179.7 (specifying final conditions for 
completion of enforceable obligations and Redevelopment dissolution).  
257. The data is unavailable primarily because the current data tracking system in 
San Francisco tracks planning entitlements not approvals from OCII. Although overall 
production counts are available for these redevelopment plan areas, additional work is 
needed to identify timelines and to disaggregate approvals on annual basis. We note that 
San Francisco has worked to make all relevant data points available to facilitate future 
comparative analysis of housing production.. 
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time frames for projects entitled under a Specific Plan—the developer’s 
entitlement application kicks off the entitlement process, not the adoption of the 
Specific Plan. 
Finally, some developers will obtain a project approval and later withdraw 
it, with the intent of filing for a new application. Despite the fact that this approval 
was later withdrawn, we still count the entitlement in our database because it 
successfully completed the planning process, regardless of whether it will ever be 
built. 
3. Extracting the project data 
 
To collect this data, we reviewed a jurisdiction’s website to see what 
information could be readily obtained by reviewing public notices for all 
environmental review documents, lists of approved developments, parcel 
information maps, among other relevant information. We also searched property 
addresses within a jurisdiction’s database to gather parcel-level information, such 
as lot size, census tract, and assessor data. To obtain information on property tax 
assessment and land transaction records, we searched by street address in 
Lexis/Nexis Public Records. We tracked any obvious holes in the data to confirm 
with planning department staff, and in some cases, we requested additional data 
through public records requests.  
To analyze how each residential development of five or more units 
navigated the entitlement process, we gathered approximately twenty-five 
characteristics per development, relating to current site usage, proposed project 
characteristics, types of entitlements and environmental review, and approval 
timeline, including appeals. Where projects received more than one entitlement, 
we noted all entitlements, which is why the total land use approvals per jurisdiction 
are far greater than the number of projects. Similarly, many jurisdictions processed 
projects under more than one CEQA pathway—combining multiple project-based 
exemptions or a project-based exemption with review that tiered off a prior 
document. Depending on the accessibility of public data, these characteristics are 
drawn from project approval documents, zoning geographic information systems 
(“GIS”), tax assessor records, and city council and planning commission meeting 
minutes. This data revealed how local governments apply their planning code and 
other relevant ordinances at a micro level.  
We entered this project specific data into an excel spreadsheet, retaining 
assigned project identifiers, all original descriptors, dates, and all unit counts. We 
then assigned a numeric code to specific project characteristics, use of local land 
use processes, and types of environmental review documents/exemptions to enable 
analysis of timeframes and frequency of certain approval types. To determine 
timeframes, we counted days from the application file date through the approval 
of the last discretionary entitlement, and then converted them into months by 
dividing by 30.5.  
To provide a comprehensive assessment of all litigation against the 
entitled development projects of five or more units, we searched state and county 
records to identify all writs filed against each of our selected cities in the timeframe 
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of 2014 through 2017. We then pulled the records associated with litigated projects 
of five or more residential units entitled during our study period. 
To spatially analyze this data, we mapped all city boundaries using data 
available from the city (San Francisco, Oakland) or Stanford’s Digital Repository 
(San Jose, Redwood City, Palo Alto). Mapping of San Francisco plan areas uses 
GIS data from the San Francisco Planning Department. Area plan polygons for 
Redwood City, Oakland, and San Jose use georeferencing planning documentation 
maps to street centerline data for each municipality. BatchGeo provided geocoding 
for project addresses.  
 
Figure 2: Project Characteristics  
 
 
We then conducted initial analysis of our residential development 
database to identify possible entitlement patterns and inform the scope of 
interviews. We identified the land use characteristics that appeared to be associated 
most frequently with protracted development approval timelines, as well as the 
development characteristics that appeared to be associated with contentious 
approvals processes. This analysis yielded potential patterns of either accelerated 
timelines, protracted timelines, or contentious approval processes for residential 
development within certain areas.  
We supplemented gaps in available online data with requests to planning 
staff officials. After the publication of our first working paper in February 2018,258 
San Francisco Planning Department provided us with more data, which enabled us 
to add ten developments that were not previously in our database. While 
 
258. Moira O’Neill, Giulia Gualco-Nelson & Eric Biber, Getting it Right: Examining 
the Local Land Use Entitlement Process in California to Inform Policy and Process 
(Working Paper Feb. 2018), https://perma.cc/P68H-XY5E. 
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researching appeals, we discovered another large discrepancy with Oakland, which 
led us to add twenty-three new developments to our database that were not 
available to us when performing our initial search. Still, for reasons described in 
Part III, Oakland data access is limited. Of the ninety total developments in 
Oakland, we were only able to obtain final approval documents for forty-nine of 
these developments. San Jose also dropped two projects since the time of our prior 
paper due to duplicate projects that had separate entitlements filed under different 
addresses. While these new projects influenced the entitlement rates in these 
jurisdictions, they did not significantly alter our findings.  
D. Diving deeper into local context: in-depth interviews with 
key informants 
 
To explore how law is applied in ways that project-level data could not, 
alone, reveal, we conducted in-depth interviews with key informants from each 
jurisdiction we chose to study. Building on our professional expertise in the field 
of land use, we used purposive sampling259 to generate a list of potential 
participants across four stakeholder groups across all five cities: (1) public agency 
staff (including local planning staff, housing and community development staff, 
and city attorneys), (2) developers (market-rate and non-profit affordable), (3) 
community-based organizations and advocates, and (4) consultants (design, legal, 
and entitlement).260 We identified seventy potential interview participants through 
examination of websites, professional reports, and project-level data. We 
successfully recruited twenty-nine participants for in depth interviews, with at least 
one participant within each stakeholder group and within each city. Some 
participants sat for more than one interview and had more than one role, which is 
why the totals do not add up to twenty-nine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
259. Although not engaging with a survey tool, we wanted to make sure that the 
participants were in some way representative of both stakeholders that directly interact with 
entitlement processes and stakeholders engaged with local-level policy reform that directly 
influences entitlement processes within these five cities. We therefore considered various 
forms of “sampling” used in survey methods when constructing our research design. See 
Purposive Sampling, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS (Paul J. Lavrakas 
ed., 2008), http://methods.sagepub.com/reference/encyclopedia-of-survey-research-method 
s/n419.xml.  
260. In some cases, a single participant could represent more than one stakeholder 
group. In some instances, individuals we interviewed worked in, or for, two or more of the 
cities within our group of five. 
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Figure 3: Research Interviews by Category 
 
 Public 
Agency 
Staff  
Developers Community-
Based 
Organizations
/Advocates 
Consultants 
 
Total 
San 
Francisco 3 4 2 3 12 
San Jose 
3 2 3 4 12 
Oakland 
3 3 2 1 9 
Redwood 
City 
3 
 3 3 2 11 
Palo Alto 
3 3 3 4 13 
Total 
15 15 13 14 57 
 
We conducted semi-structured interviews261 with open-ended questions 
to collect perceptions of: the jurisdiction’s approvals process, land use taxonomies 
that contribute most to delays and cost, the role of community in the public 
approvals process, social-economic-political factors that shape development 
patterns including important context (such as the local political climate and 
community tensions at play), and technical details not immediately obvious in the 
development data. We concluded interviews by sharing preliminary findings from 
our datasets with participants to gather feedback. 
We transcribed our interviews verbatim and used open coding262 to 
identify themes that emerged from the interviews. We then analyzed the interviews 
to identify perceptions about both local and state-level obstacles to advancing 
equitable infill development and whether proposed (and relevant) statewide 
legislative action might succeed in reducing time lags caused by local regulatory 
processes and the potential trade-offs (if any) of reducing those time lags. We then 
triangulated the data from our planning and development code summaries and 
development database (including identified patterns within the project-level data) 
with the themes emerging from interviews to test potential explanations of patterns 
and themes that we extracted from the interviews. 
 
 
 
 
 
261. See BERG & LUNE, supra note 229, at 112–14. 
262. See BERG & LUNE, supra note 229, at 364–72. 
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Part III:Findings 
 
While our research continues, and we will be adding jurisdictions to our 
data set, we can provide an overview of completed research within our first Bay 
Area jurisdictions.  
 
A. All residential development of five or more units is 
discretionary in these cities, and each city imposes 
discretionary review at multiple points in the entitlement 
process 
 
All five jurisdictions we examined require discretionary review for 
residential developments of five or more units. These discretionary review 
processes apply even if these developments comply with the underlying zoning 
code.263 Four of these cities use aesthetic controls as a primary discretionary review 
mechanism. Oakland uses Design Review,264 whereas Redwood City and Palo Alto 
employ Architectural Review.265 San Jose chooses to use a Site Development 
Permit.266 Among these five cities, San Francisco is unique in that it does not 
impose design or site development review on all projects. But San Francisco, 
through its city charter, imposes discretionary review on all proposed projects.267 
Absent its city charter that renders building permits discretionary, San Francisco 
would have permitted as of right nine projects — each ranging from eight to sixty-
seven units. As Figure 4 shows, no other planning code in our case studies would 
permit this level of development without a discretionary approval. This is an 
example of how a charter city can impose discretionary review through a 
mechanism outside of the formalized planning and zoning process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
263. For a discussion of discretionary review, see Part I supra note 34. 
264. OAKLAND MUNI. CODE §§ 17.136.040(3)–(4), 17.136.025(B)(1)(d). 
265. REDWOOD CITY MUNI. CODE § 45.2(A); PALO ALTO MUNI. CODE § 
18.76.020(b)(2)(B). 
266. SAN JOSE MUNI. CODE § 20.100.010. 
267. A city charter is the constitution for that local government. The provision of San 
Francisco’s charter rendering all permits discretionary can be found in S.F. BUS. AND TAX 
REGULATIONS CODE § 26(a). 
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Figure 4: Discretionary Review of Developments Consistent with Zoning 
 
Jurisdiction Primary Discretionary Review 
Mechanism  
Residential Developments 
Exempt from Discretionary 
Review 
San Francisco Building Permits None 
San Jose Site Development Permit Single-family homes in 
limited circumstances.268 
Redwood City Architectural Permit One-story single-family 
homes and duplexes 
Palo Alto Design Review Up to two single-family 
homes and two duplexes.269 
Oakland Design Review Secondary units  
 
It is also notable that within these five cities, the total numbers of land 
use/planning approvals are greater than the number of overall development 
projects in each jurisdiction. A single project might need to obtain Design Review 
approval and a Minor Variance from the Director of the Planning Department and 
a rezoning from the City Council.270 Figure 5 illustrates. This requires a project to 
navigate multiple levels of local government review, which means that there is 
more than one step in the approval process that would pull the project within the 
scope of local discretion and trigger environmental review. It should also be noted 
that if development requires the subdivision of land into smaller parcels, additional 
discretionary review by local governments generally applies as well, which is 
accounted for in these numbers.271 As Figure 5 also shows, the number of 
discretionary reviews per project does not differ dramatically across our 
jurisdictions, with Redwood City requiring, on average, the highest number of 
discretionary approvals.272 
 
 
 
 
268. To be exempt from site development permits, single-family homes must meet 
height, FAR, and lot size requirements and cannot be located in riparian areas. SAN JOSE 
MUNI. CODE § 20.100.1030(A)–(C).  
269. To qualify for design review exemption, the proposed development cannot be 
located in a conservation zone. PALO ALTO MUNI. CODE § 18.76.020(b)(2)(D). 
270. See S.F. MUNI. CODE § 305 (limiting review of variances to the Zoning 
Administrator and Board of Appeals). In practice, many jurisdictions do permit concurrent 
review of entitlement applications. See e.g., SAN JOSE MUNI. CODE § 20.100.140 (permitting 
concurrent review of multiple entitlement applications); OAKLAND MUNI. CODE § 17. 
136.040(D) (permitting the Director to refer design review applications to the Planning 
Commission when coupled with certain types of variances).  
271. For more information on subdivision, see supra notes 38–39. 
272. To determine the number of discretionary approvals required per jurisdiction, 
we calculate total approvals and divide by the number of projects and then add one extra 
approval for CEQA. 
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Figure 5: Types of Discretionary Review per Jurisdiction 
 
Entitlement Types 
San 
Jose 
San 
Francisco Oakland 
Palo 
Alto 
Redwood 
City 
Site Development 
Permit/Design 
Review 13  0 89 5 9 
Planned 
Development Permit 50 5 9  0 4 
Conditional Use 
Permit (“CUP”) 0 33 55  0 1 
Tentative Map 
Permit 36 59 33 4 8 
Rezoning  46 4 1  0  0 
Historic 
Preservation 
Permit/Certificate of 
Appropriateness 3 2  0 1 4 
GP Amendment 5 1  0  0  0 
State or Local 
Density Bonus 1 3 2  0 1 
Specific Plan Permit  0 50  0  0 4 
Specific Plan 
Exception  0 32  0  0  0 
Variance  0 34 39 3 1 
Development 
Agreement  0  0  0  0 4 
Other Approval  4 6 1 0  0  
Total 158 229 229 13 36 
Average Approvals 
per project 2.43 2.41 2.54 2.60 2.77 
Average Approvals 
with CEQA 3.43 3.41 3.54 3.60 3.77 
 
B. Four of these cities are all employing state-level statutory 
provisions to facilitate and expedite environmental review 
for developers 
 
State law allows cities to take a diverse range of approaches to comply 
with CEQA requirements.273 EIRs—the most onerous form of CEQA review—
 
273. For a discussion of the various environmental review options, see supra Part 
I.A.2. 
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occurred infrequently across all jurisdictions.274 Relatively few projects within 
these five cities require a full EIR process primarily because jurisdictions are taking 
advantage of project- or tiering-based exemptions.275 The figure below 
demonstrates that exemptions are the most common type of CEQA review for 
projects in most jurisdictions, with EIRs and MNDs in second and third place, 
respectively.276 The most common forms of project-based exemptions included the 
Class 32 (infill), Class 3 (small structures), and Class 1 (existing facilities) 
exemptions discussed in Part I supra. 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of Projects by CEQA Review Type 
 
 
San 
Jose 
San 
Francisco Oakland 
Redwood 
City Palo Alto 
Exempt 
(Tiering) 46% 69% 106% 69% 0% 
Exempt 
(Project 
Based) 3% 11% 83% 15% 40% 
ND 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 
MND 46% 9% 0% 8% 20% 
EIR 22% 8% 3% 8% 40% 
 
Even when adjusting by number of units, relatively few units go through 
EIRs with the exception of Palo Alto; however, more units are going through EIRs 
than MNDs. Additionally, more units go through tiering than project-based 
exemptions, with the exception of Oakland.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
274. These are similar findings with LANDIS ET AL., supra note 168, at 99, 105. 
275. For a discussion of tiering, see supra Part I.A.2. 
276. As discussed below, a single project can undergo more than one type of CEQA 
review. Figures 6 and 7 do not back out these projects that receive multiple exemptions, 
which is why the percentages exceed 100 percent of the total number of projects and units. 
Oakland in particular will apply multiple tiering and project-based exemptions to a single 
project.  
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Figure 7: Percentage of Units by CEQA Review Type 
 
  San Jose 
San 
Francisco Oakland 
Redwood 
City 
Palo 
Alto 
Exempt 
(Tiering) 54% 64% 89% 89% 0% 
Exempt 
(Project 
Based) 0% 3% 52% 9% 7% 
ND 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 
MND 14% 11% 0% 1% 3% 
EIR 49% 24% 9% 1% 90% 
 
Four of these jurisdictions appear to be making good faith efforts to 
engage in strategies that link housing and jobs to transportation and facilitate 
environmental review for developers. This means that each of these four cities is 
tapping into state-level statutory provisions designed to promote sustainable 
development by doing the bulk of the work to comply with CEQA, rather than 
imposing additional time and costs on developers. For example, the vast majority 
of relevant projects entitled within San Francisco and Oakland are also within 
specific plan areas that rely on these state-level statutory provisions to facilitate 
environmental review.277  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
277. For similar findings in the prior literature, see LANDIS ET AL., supra note 168, at 
107–08. 
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Figure 8: San Francisco Project Locations and Prior Uses278  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
278. This map does not include residential development that OCII would be 
responsible for; however, this development is occurring in the eastern part of San Francisco, 
which does not alter our analysis that permissive density is not spread across the City evenly.  
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Figure 9: San Jose Project Locations and Prior Uses 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Oakland Project Locations and Prior Uses 
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Figure 11: Redwood City Project Locations and Prior Uses 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Palo Alto Project Locations and Prior Uses 
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C. Use of CEQA exemptions varies across cities 
 
Like the discretionary review mechanisms discussed above, many 
projects in Oakland are receiving multiple CEQA exemptions, which leaves open 
the question of why planners take these additional measures. Interview data 
suggests planners are doubling up on CEQA exemptions to forestall against 
perceived political challenges to the project. If a project qualifies for more than one 
CEQA exemption, planners will evaluate the project under each possible 
exemption. Other jurisdictions, however, rarely make use of exemptions outside of 
tiering situations. For example, given that most development in these jurisdictions 
is infill, the fact that so much development receives the Class 32 exemption in 
Oakland, but not San Francisco or San Jose, is peculiar. Interview data also 
indicates that within Palo Alto, Redwood City, and San Jose there may be some 
confusion within planning departments and amongst developers about which types 
of CEQA documents are the most legally vulnerable on appeal. Perception of legal 
defensibility may in turn inform decisions on which type of CEQA review to 
undertake. 
Analyzing project size as a function of CEQA, data shows that projects 
with EIRs in these five cities generally tend to be larger than projects that undergo 
other types of CEQA review. All jurisdictions with the exception of Redwood City 
prepared an EIR for their single largest project. Nonetheless, the projects going 
through the exemption process are not small, averaging over fifty units for four of 
our five jurisdictions.279 
Yet significant inter-jurisdictional variations still persist.280 Projects that 
received a project-based exemption in Oakland are on average, twice the size as 
projects that received a project-based exemption in San Francisco. In Redwood 
City, projects that use tiering are larger than projects that use tiering in both San 
Francisco and Oakland. Figure 7 shows that even with a larger mean size for EIRs, 
EIRs are a small fraction of the total capacity being entitled in most jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
279. Cf. Hernandez, Friedman & DeHerrera, supra note 219, at 31 (“the 
overwhelming majority of CEQA compliance documents, however, involve the use of 
restricted regulatory exemptions for extremely minor projects, such as repairing single-
family homes, acquiring park lands, making minor modifications to existing uses such as 
modifying signage or repairing piping or other infrastructure, etc.”). 
280. The variability in environmental review processes is consistent with Gyourko, 
Saiz & Summers, supra note 113, at 694, who found significant variability in local land use 
regulation. 
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Figure 13: Mean Project Size By CEQA Type 
 
 San Jose 
San 
Francisco Oakland 
Redwood 
City 
Palo 
Alto 
All Types of 
Exemption 193 84 93 98 10 
Tiering 
Exemptions 205 94 96 109 0 
Project Based 
Exemptions 8 24 67 51 10 
ND 10 125 0 0 0 
MND 69 117 0 12 8 
EIR 403 291 282 8 125 
 
D. There is substantial variation in entitlement timelines 
across these five cities that does not appear to correspond 
with stringency in either environmental regulation or local 
entitlement processes, or project size 
 
Timeframes for entitlements vary significantly across jurisdictions for 
similar projects and across different project sizes within the same jurisdiction. 
Focusing first on environmental review processes, the difference in timeframes 
does not appear immediately attributable to environmental review legal 
requirements. Instead, it appears these cities apply the same environmental review 
provisions to similar projects in different ways—with significant variations in the 
total timelines for entitlement. For example, both the City of Oakland and the City 
of San Francisco use the section 15183 Community Plan Exemptions (“CPE”) to 
reduce CEQA compliance obligations for proposed projects within plan areas281 
that have a relatively recent full EIR that the respective city completed. However, 
Oakland’s CPE process moves much faster than San Francisco’s. The median CPE 
entitlement in Oakland is seven months. In San Francisco, a CPE takes over 
twenty-four months. In contrast, a full EIR in San Jose, for which there is no prior 
study, takes nearly thirty months, just six months longer than a CPE in San 
Francisco.282  
 
281. Plan Area terminology varies according to jurisdictions and the size of the plan 
area. Redwood City refers to these plans as “Precise Plans,” San Jose and Oakland both use 
the terms “Area Plans” and “Specific Plans,” and San Francisco calls them “Area Plans.” 
282. Some jurisdictions apply different types of CEQA review to a single project. A 
CPE in Oakland is often combined with a section 15332 exemption. EIRs in San Jose are 
often paired with later addendums or supplemental EIRs. A CPE in San Francisco can be 
paired with a Focused EIR. The numbers above do not control for these multiple types of 
CEQA review due to the small sample sizes that would result. Even controlling for multiple 
types of CEQA review, the general trends hold true. Projects that only received a CPE in 
Oakland took 7 months; projects in San Francisco that only received a CPE still take 23 
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Interview data attributes the delay in environmental review within cities 
to planning practice and the level of attention put into staff reports, rather than the 
complexities of particular project proposals. Jurisdictions vary in a developer’s 
ability to manage and communicate with their CEQA consultants during the 
preparation of the environmental documents. Interview participants shared the 
perception that the inability to directly select or manage consultants can lead to 
lower quality environmental documents, as well as time delays.283 These results 
also indicate the potential importance of political context in the approval 
process.284 
Figures 14 and 15 together indicate that the number of approvals required 
(often used as one important metric for stringency) does not necessarily correspond 
to entitlement timelines.285 All five cities impose discretionary review on all 
projects through multiple local regulations, and all require, on average, more than 
three approvals (including environmental review). But, the variability in timelines 
for similarly sized projects is great. Redwood City had shorter timeframes for 
entitlement, particularly compared to San Francisco and San Jose. Interview 
participants highlighted how variability in entitlement timelines tends to be related 
to local practice. Examples include staff-level variations in performing application 
intake, to higher-level decisions on the amount of commercial development that 
must occur before a developer-applicant can even propose residential development 
in certain neighborhoods.286 These choices in practice may be a response to 
political and fiscal pressures that prompt cities to embed discretionary review into 
the entitlement process. 
Project size also does not appear to explain delay in approval timelines. 
Large projects do not always take longer to entitle than small projects. In San Jose, 
 
months; projects that only received an EIR in San Jose took 14 months (measuring by the 
median). 
283. See e.g., SAN FRANCISCO PLANNING DEP’T, Environmental Review Process 
Summary 5 (2011), https://perma.cc/8BLP-B4T4 (“While the project sponsor pays all costs 
for preparation of the necessary consultant-prepared documents, the Department scopes, 
monitors, reviews, and approves all work completed by consultants”). 
284. See John Quigley, Raphael & Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 281–282. 
285. These results are consistent with Jackson, supra note 130, at 141, who found 
that regulatory stringency did not affect supply elasticity, and are in tension with Gyourko, 
Saiz & Summers, supra note 113, at 695, who found that regulatory stringency did correlate 
with timeframes. See also, supra Figure 5. 
286. San Jose’s Urban Villages, for example, are transit-oriented, mixed-use 
neighborhoods that aim to balance job and housing growth. San Jose, Envision San Jose 
2040 General Plan, Chapter 1 at 18 (2018). To achieve this, Urban Villages utilize “Growth 
Horizons” that stipulate certain commercial and office targets before residential 
development can be unlocked (with the exception of 100% affordable housing 
developments). Id. at Chapter 7 at 6, 19. While San Jose has long shouldered much of the 
region’s housing burden without commensurate increases in job growth, these policies can 
impede residential growth in transit-accessible locations. See Memorandum from Harry 
Freitas and Kim Walesh to Honorable Mayor and City Council (Apr. 3, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/LM39-GC3T (noting that San Jose is the only major city in the US with 
more residents leaving San Jose during the day to go to work than non-residents commuting 
in for work). 
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projects between five to twenty-five units take nearly seven months longer to 
entitle than projects with more than 150 units. In Redwood City the difference is 
about five months, which is significant given Redwood City’s entitlement 
timeframe is seven months across all projects. Figure 14 shows the mean and 
median entitlement timeframes across jurisdictions by project size.287 The extreme 
intra-jurisdictional variation skews mean timeframes higher. 
 
Figure 14: Total Entitlement Time Frames by Project Size 
 
Figure 15 below narrows the approval timeframe to sixty months—in the 
process removing some outlier projects visible in Figure 14—but provides a better 
representation of means and medians across all jurisdictions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
287. When referencing timeframes in this Article we refer to the median unless 
otherwise noted. 
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Figure 15: Entitlement Timelines Within 60 Months by Project Size  
 
Although we are pursuing additional research to better understand issues 
with project size, multiple explanations for the different outcomes emerged in 
interviews. One potential explanation is that smaller projects are occurring in areas 
that do not benefit from prior environmental review and thus cannot tier off a prior 
environmental document. Another potential theory is that the type of developer 
building in the twenty-five-unit range lacks the capital and sophistication to 
navigate the approval process as efficiently as developers undertaking larger 
projects. In interviews, small developers expressed feelings of being shut out from 
the Bay Area development boom because of a lack of access to key planning 
departmental staff or the inability to afford the right consultants with well-
established relationships in the planning department.  
 
E. Substantial variation in housing project entitlement 
across these five cities exists despite regulatory stringency 
 
Similarly, housing entitlement—both as a measure of land area and 
population—varies dramatically. As a measure of land area, San Francisco entitles 
the most housing despite it having the longest approval timeframe. 288 San 
Francisco is also the most geographically constrained jurisdiction in our dataset 
years; when measuring land area as a function of population, San Francisco has the 
densest existing development. This is not entirely consistent with research in Part 
I that linked more geographically constrained regions with supply constraints.289 
 
288. As discussed in Part II, entitlement numbers for San Francisco do not include 
units approved through OCII—the successor to the former Redevelopment Agency—in 
Redevelopment Plan Areas. This data is still unavailable. 
289. See Saiz, supra note 129, at 1254. 
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Redwood City has the second-fastest approval timeline, but entitles less housing 
per square mile than San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose. Redwood City is also 
one of the least geographically constrained cities. Interview data suggests that 
market barriers, such as the differential cost of construction and sale or rental 
prices, do not entirely explain this discrepancy. In low-density communities, 
developers are also factoring in the political feasibility of proposing a denser 
product, even where that density is permissible under the base zoning. This 
suggests that in jurisdictions with overall low-density development patterns, a 
streamlined approval process may be insufficient to entitle substantial housing, if 
barriers like lack of appropriately zoned land and/or lack of political will are 
present. 290 
 
Figure 16: Entitlement Production by Land Area and Population Intensity 
 
  
Land 
Area 
(mi2)291  
Total 
Entitled 
Units 
Entitled 
Units per 
Square 
Mile Population 
Population 
Per Square 
Mile292 
San 
Francisco  47 9,768 208 870,887  18,581  
San Jose 177 11,463 65 1,025,000  5,806  
Oakland 56 8,958 161  420,005  7,528  
Redwood 
City 19 1,100 57  84,950  4,374  
Palo Alto 24 277 12 67,024  2,807  
 
Adjusting on a per capita basis, Oakland and Redwood City—the two 
jurisdictions with the fastest timelines—are on top in terms of output, with 
Oakland in a distant lead.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
290. This appears consistent with Kristoffer Jackson, supra note 130, at 141, who 
found that regulatory stringency did not affect supply elasticity, and is in tension with 
Gyourko, Saiz & Summers, supra note 113, at 695. 
291. Land areas taken from the 2010 Census. See, QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://perma.cc/L97A-BD8T (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).  
292. Population taken from American Communities Survey 2012-2016 estimates. 
See American Community Survey Data Profiles, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.ce 
nsus.gov/acs/www/data/data-tables-and-tools/data-profiles/2016/ [https://perma.cc/3T9K-
8RPQ] (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).  
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Figure 17: Units Entitled Per 1,000 People Over 3 Years 
 
  Population Entitled Units 
Units per 
1,000 people 
over 3 years 
San Francisco  870,887 9,768  11  
San Jose  1,025,000 11,463  11  
Oakland  420,005 8,958  21  
Redwood City  84,950 1,100 13  
Palo Alto  67,024 277  4  
 
Potential explanations for Oakland’s lead may be both local context293 and 
local government initiatives to accelerate dense infill development.294 The 
community’s response to concerns of gentrification, increasing housing costs, and 
displacement have included community based organizations advocating and 
collaborating with the regional transit agency to support dense TOD with major 
affordability components.295 These combined factors involved major phased 
developments, some beginning in the 1990s, with phases in the 2014, 2015, 2016 
data years contributing to the number of units entitled during our study years. 
Interview participants also shared perceptions of differing political and community 
pressure around development outcomes and processes across these cities. 
Interview participants described Oakland as generally welcoming development, 
San Francisco as welcoming of affordable development but not as favorable to 
major market-rate development projects, and Palo Alto as welcoming of very little 
dense development. Some participants who work in multiple cities also shared the 
perception that the political and community responses to development in Oakland 
will begin to mirror their observations in San Francisco. 
 
 
293. Oakland experienced decades of population decline and disinvestment 
distinguishable from the other cities and has historically had a lower median household income 
and higher rate of poverty. See generally Robert O. Self, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR POSTWAR OAKLAND (2005); Chris Rhomberg, NO THERE THERE: RACE, CLASS, 
AND POLITCAL COMMUNITY IN OAKLAND (2007). We draw comparisons of rate of poverty and 
median household incomes from 2010 census data and American Community Survey 
estimates. See QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 291. 
294. The City of Oakland began its 10K program in the 1990s under former Mayor 
Jerry Brown, who Professor Rhomberg described as having “offered Oakland as a haven to 
private developers fleeing overbuilt conditions in San Francisco and promised to expedite 
approval for market-rate apartments and condominiums built without city subsidies or 
requirements for affordable housing.” Rhomberg, supra note 293, at 189. The 10K initiative 
generated controversy and exacerbated existing concerns about increasing housing costs, 
gentrification, and the displacement of people of color. Rhomberg, supra note 293, at 183–94. 
295. For example, the Unity Council in the Fruitvale neighborhood took the lead on 
several major TOD development projects around the Fruitvale BART station with 
affordability and community use components—work that began as early as 1992. 
Rhomberg, supra note 293, at 190–92. 
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F. Most of the projects entitled within these three years 
involve the development of housing where there was none 
 
Whether proposed development risks displacement through the 
conversion or elimination of affordable housing—including rent controlled, deed 
restricted, or naturally affordable housing—presents an important equity 
consideration. This also implicates important climate concerns if residential 
demolition is reducing overall density. During these project years, the majority of 
residential developments of five or more units or more entitled within all cities are 
on vacant or commercial land,296 rather than land with a prior residential use. These 
results are summarized below and displayed in Figures 8–12 above.  
 
Figure 18: Prior Parcel Uses  
 
Prior Parcel Use 
San 
Jose 
San 
Francisco Oakland 
Palo 
Alto 
Redwood 
City 
Residential 23 2 11 1 4 
Residential % 35% 2% 12% 20% 31% 
Commercial 24 87 45 3 5 
Commercial % 37% 92% 50% 60% 38% 
Vacant 15 5 34 1 1 
Vacant % 23% 5% 38% 20% 8% 
 
Redwood City and San Jose have higher occurrences of entitlement where 
the prior use was residential. Of the four projects that replaced residential uses in 
Redwood City, at least two were multifamily structures. In San Jose, the vast 
majority of these residential uses are single-family homes—and the new 
developments were substantially denser than the single-family homes that were 
demolished. In San Jose, four of the twenty-three projects that replaced residential 
uses were multi-family structures that could potentially have been subject to rent 
control. One of these multi-family buildings was a 216-unit rent-controlled 
building whose demolition left many long-time residents with few other affordable 
rental options.297 These rent-controlled units were not replaced in the new 
development, nor did the new development contain inclusionary housing units.298 
From our limited data, it seems this scale of rent-controlled demolition is rare in 
these cities; however, more research is needed to investigate other potential rent-
 
296. Vacant land includes lots with no improvements or lots that contain a surface 
parking lot with no permanent structures. Commercial land includes lots with commercial 
or industrial uses, such as warehouses, restaurants, storage facilities, or retail. Residential 
lots include single-family homes, mobile homes, multifamily buildings, single room 
occupancy hotels, and residential motels.  
297. Ramona Giwargis, San Jose council denies appeal to stop Reserve apartment 
demolition, THE MERCURY NEWS (June 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/EN52-FXDE. 
298. Ramona Giwargis, San Jose: Tempers flare over The Reserve displacement, 
THE MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/5HCX-28AL.  
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controlled demolitions in our jurisdictions. Lastly, we found no deed-restricted 
affordable housing that was demolished during our project-years. 
 
G. Deed-restricted affordable housing entitlement is low 
across all jurisdictions; however, deed-restricted 
affordable housing benefits from faster approval time 
frames 
 
Entitlement rates (in terms of units) to support affordable housing 
production across all jurisdictions are low for these years. San Francisco—the only 
jurisdiction to apply inclusionary housing requirements to both rental and for sale 
housing during the project years299—has the highest rates of entitlement of 
affordable housing by units, with 11% of all new units deed-restricted to low and 
middle income households. 100% of deed-restricted affordable housing in San 
Francisco is entitled in just over twelve months, which is thirteen months faster 
than market rate development. In San Jose, an affordable development is entitled 
nearly ten months faster than market rate development. In Oakland—where the 
process is compressed relative to San Francisco and San Jose—affordable 
development is approved about two months faster than market rate development.  
Unlike other Bay Area jurisdictions, most of the affordable housing units 
entitled in San Francisco outside of former Redevelopment Areas came through 
inclusionary obligations imposed on market-rate developers.300 While we do not 
have complete data on inclusionary housing compliance for all our developments 
in San Francisco, at least twenty-eight developments—30% of projects—elected 
to pay the in-lieu fee rather than build the housing on-site. As our interviews 
highlight, the in-lieu fees are important sources of gap finance for nonprofit 
affordable housing developers especially after the dissolution of the 
Redevelopment Agency.301 Interestingly, the jurisdictions with the fastest 
 
299. San Jose’s inclusionary housing ordinance was on hold during the first two 
years of our research due to ongoing litigation. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of 
San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435, 443 (2015) (noting that the California Superior Court enjoined 
implementation of the ordinance). Though the California Supreme Court upheld the 
inclusionary housing ordinance against a takings challenge, the ordinance only applied to 
for-sale developments during our project years. See id. at 442, 461. The ordinance currently 
applies to both for-sale and rental developments. See SAN JOSE MUNI. CODE § 5.08.400.  
300. The opposite is likely true in former Redevelopment Areas managed by OCII. 
See Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure, Affordable Housing Production 
Report Fiscal Year 2016-2017 (noting that 552 funded affordable housing units and 51 
inclusionary units were completed in fiscal year 2016-2017). Funded projects refer to 100% 
affordable housing developments as opposed to inclusionary housing units, where the 
affordable housing units are a smaller percentage of the total units. This also underscores 
the importance of redevelopment for affordable housing production. 
301. The Community Redevelopment Act gave local governments the authority to 
declare areas as blighted and in need of urban renewal, which enabled the city or county to 
distribute most of the growth in property tax revenue for the project area to the relevant 
Redevelopment Agencies as tax-increment revenues. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 
33020 et seq. In 2011, the California legislature dissolved the Redevelopment Agencies. See 
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entitlement time frames—Oakland and Redwood City—also have the lowest rate 
of entitlement of affordable units, which may suggest affordable housing 
developers need more than an efficient process to make deals feasible. Interview 
data also suggests that high land and labor costs, coupled with the loss of funding 
from Redevelopment Agency tax increment programs302 are primary barriers to 
developing more affordable units within these cities. The interviews yielded 
differing accounts as to whether discretionary approval imposed significant 
challenges to affordable development. Notably, interview data indicated that an 
increasingly elaborate building permit process also poses barriers to the timely 
completion of affordable developments. While the scope of this study does not 
address the length and complexity of the actual building permit process, this is an 
important area for future study.  
 
Figure 19: Affordable Units by Jurisdiction 
 
 
San 
Jose 
San 
Francisco Oakland 
Palo 
Alto 
Redwood 
City 
# Units 11,463 9,755 9,555 277 1,100 
# Affordable 
Units 613 1,110 333 70 11 
Affordable 
% 5% 11% 4% 25% 1% 
 
Given the three-year timeframe of our study, and because 100% 
affordable housing developments are so infrequently entitled, the rate of 
entitlement (in terms of percentage number of units entitled) is by itself insufficient 
to determine a jurisdiction’s policy on affordable housing. Palo Alto is emblematic. 
While Palo Alto had the lowest rate of entitled units across all our Bay Area cities, 
it had the highest rate of affordable housing entitlements (25%), because a large 
affordable development happened to be entitled during our project years. Instead, 
looking at the planning and development codes for the presence of local ordinances 
that directly incentivize affordable development, the overall rate of entitlement in 
terms of units entitled, and entitlement timeframes provides a more accurate 
assessment of a city’s affordable housing policy. 
 
 
A.B. X126, 2011-2012 (Cal. 2011), https://perma.cc/5FSN-AMNH. Dissolution has 
severely constricted local governments’ ability to finance affordable housing. See Casey 
Blount et al., Redevelopment Agencies in California: History, Benefits, Excesses, and 
Closure (2014), https://perma.cc/3QUD-FPTY (estimating a statewide average annual loss 
of 4,500 to 6,500 new affordable units). 
302. These tax-increment revenues were a large source of affordable housing 
finance. See Blount, supra note 301.  
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H. San Francisco, Redwood City, Oakland, and San Jose all 
provide for density and development incentives to 
promote transit-oriented development that have caused 
developers to site most development in these growth 
incentive zones 
 
Most jurisdictions in our study are easing density and parking restrictions 
in targeted growth areas near transit and are drawing on Specific Plans to facilitate 
development in targeted growth areas. Downtown San Jose—with its proximity to 
Caltrain and light rail—is one example. San Jose’s General Plan lifted height 
limitations in most downtown areas, giving developers more flexibility in design 
and construction type.303 The General Plan also allows for up to 800 dwelling units 
per acre and a 30.0 FAR for mixed-use projects in the downtown area.304 These are 
high densities relative to San Jose’s Mixed-Use Commercial Districts where 
residential developments max out at six stories and fifty dwelling units per acre.305 
Parking reductions of up to fifty percent are also available for certain mixed-use 
projects in downtown.306 Additionally, San Jose’s Diridon Station Area Plan 
rezoned land including portions of downtown and areas adjacent to the Diridon 
Caltrain station, to allow for residential use at higher densities than previously 
allowed, with the goal of connecting transit-accessible housing to jobs.307 
While Redwood City’s historic pattern of land use development is largely 
auto-centric, the City’s current General Plan focuses growth and development in 
mixed‐use activity centers and along pedestrian-friendly transportation corridors 
that are connected to the regional transit system. The General Plan allows for more 
intense development (40 to 60 dwelling units per acre) along major thoroughfares, 
particularly Veterans Boulevard, Broadway, and El Camino Real.308 Redwood 
City’s Downtown Precise Plan (“DTPP”) also seeks to create a “pedestrian 
friendly, walkable district [with] good transit access.”309 Instead of focusing solely 
on increased development incentives, like reduced parking or open space 
requirements or more permissive density, Redwood City accomplishes its vision 
by improving processes that facilitate faster review and approvals for development 
 
303. SAN JOSE MUNI. CODE § 20.70.200. Because of the downtown area’s 
proximity to the airport, no building can be permitted with a height that exceeds the 
elevation restrictions prescribed under Federal Aviation Regulations Part 77 (14 C.F.R. 
Part 77) unless certain conditions are met. 
304. See City of San Jose, supra note 286, at Chapter 5 at 9. 
305. Id. at Chapter 5 at 6. 
306. SAN JOSE MUNI. CODE § 20.70.330. 
307. See CITY OF SAN JOSE, DIRIDON STATION AREA PLAN, Appendix B (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2018) https://perma.cc/D9E5-53ZE.  
308. See CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, GENERAL PLAN, Urban Form and Land Use at BE-
39 (2010), https://www.redwoodcity.org/departments/community-development-department 
/planning-housing/planning-services/general-plan-precise-plans/general-plan/. 
309. See REDWOOD CITY, DOWNTOWN PRECISE PLAN, Introduction at 3, (2011), 
https://www.redwoodcity.org/departments/community-development-department/planning-
housing/planning-services/general-plan-precise-plans/downtown-precise-plan.  
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projects within the DTPP. Conformance with the DTPP’s prescriptive design and 
development standards is mandatory; however, participants share the perception 
that conformance with the guidelines ensures swifter approvals, which is also 
shown in our project data.310 
Like Redwood City, San Francisco has used specific planning to 
concentrate growth in key transit-accessible neighborhoods. The City has lifted 
traditional density limitations by shifting to a form-based code in these areas so 
that building envelope and bedroom mix are the primary limitation on density.311 
San Francisco has also attempted to facilitate development in infill, transit-
accessible neighborhoods outside the boundaries of these specific plan areas 
through the use of local density bonus programs like HomeSF that can provide up 
to an additional two stories of height outside of the specific plan neighborhoods.312  
Since most development is indeed occurring within these growth areas, 
we can infer that these efforts have been successful overall—consistent with prior 
research that found that Specific Plans can facilitate approval processes.313 Much 
can also be inferred based on where projects are not sited in these jurisdictions, as 
shown by the maps in supra Part III 4. Indeed, cities are not relaxing density and 
development standards uniformly within their boundaries. Interviews suggest that 
the political will to allowing dense development only extends to certain geographic 
areas. Interview participants from Redwood City, San Francisco, and San Jose 
have characterized this as the “grand bargain,” in which constituents consent to 
increased density in growth in key areas in return for “leav[ing] the low-density 
residential neighborhoods alone.” 
In addition to the obvious equity implications of refusing to site dense 
development in lower-density areas,314 the lack of political will also has 
ramifications in cities like San Francisco, that may undermine efforts to address 
climate change. San Francisco’s western side sees virtually no development, yet is 
linked to the city’s downtown via high quality light rail and bus lines.315 Interviews 
have also raised examples of transitional single-family home neighborhoods where 
a denser residential product could be possible on paper, but not politically. The 
lack of development in these areas supports the presence of political—not 
necessarily planning or zoning—barriers.  
 
I. Very few of these entitled projects were challenged in 
court 
 
A close examination of the projects entitled during our study period in 
these five cities suggests litigation rates are quite low. At a basic level, our data 
 
310. Id.at 25. 
311. See e.g., COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, EASTERN NEIGHBORHOODS PLAN: EAST 
SOMA AREA PLAN,  
312. S.F. MUNI. CODE § 206.3. 
313. See LANDIS ET AL., supra note 168, at 95-96. 
314. See Mangin, supra note 198, at 92.  
315. See e.g., J.K. Dineen, In a wealthy SF neighborhood, residents fight low-income 
housing, S.F. CHRONICLE (Nov. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/YN4X-3YNR. 
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reveals that lawsuits challenging residential and mixed-use projects over five units 
is more common than the generic CEQA litigation rates reported in prior studies 
(all estimated at below 1%).316 Nonetheless, the overall litigation rates are low 
regardless of whether they were measured with respect to number of projects or 
number of units. This directly conflicts with the perceptions of our interview 
participants, many of whom perceived CEQA litigation rates to be much higher 
within each city. 
 
Figure 20: Litigation Rates by Project and Unit Counts 
 
 
Total 
Projects 
Total 
Units 
Litigated 
Projects % 
Litigated 
Units % 
All 
Jurisdictions 268 31,566 7 3% 1,994 6% 
San 
Francisco  95 9,768 3 3% 1,273 13% 
San Jose 65 11,463 2 3% 583 5% 
Oakland 90 8,958 1 1% 47 0% 
Redwood 
City 13 1,100 1 -- 91 8% 
Palo Alto 5 277 0 -- 0 0% 
 
The total number of projects litigated across all five cities is low. We have 
omitted the litigation rates by projects in Redwood City and Palo Alto because of 
the limited number of projects within each city (Palo Alto had no litigated projects; 
it had only a handful of projects.). For example, in Redwood City, one out of 
thirteen projects lead to a litigation rate of 8%. Comparing San Francisco (95 
entitled projects), Oakland (90 entitled projects), and San Jose (65 entitled projects) 
gives us more information on the potential impact of CEQA litigation.  
Notably, the variation in the number of lawsuits within these jurisdiction 
does not appear to coincide with overall housing entitlement approval timelines, at 
least not in these project years. San Jose’s environmental review process appears 
faster than San Francisco’s, which is one of the slowest among our jurisdictions. 
Moreover, not a single CPE was litigated in San Francisco nor in Oakland, 
therefore the litigation rates likely cannot explain the stark differences in CPE 
timeframes in these two jurisdictions.  
It also appears that only two of the nine litigated projects had affordable 
housing units within them (one with 11% and the other 33%). Both were located 
in San Francisco. Notably, none of the 100% affordable housing developments 
entitled during the study period within these five cities were litigated; however, 
 
316. See CAL. OFFICE OF SENATE RESEARCH, POLICY MATTERS (2018), 
https://perma.cc/34HL-K8SX; Smith-Heimer et al., supra note 194; CAL. ST. SENATE 
ENVTL. QUALITY COMM., CEQA SURVEY (2017), https://perma.cc/9HXP-RFYR. 
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affordable housing developments have been litigated outside our time frames and 
remain the subject of substantial press coverage.317 
Excluding settlement, CEQA defendants have frequently won more cases 
than plaintiffs.318 Settlement could be treated as a partial victory for plaintiffs, in 
which case success rates are about twice as high than for defendants. Of the 
ongoing cases, the plaintiff lost in the trial court in all three cases and then 
appealed. The success rates do not appear to vary substantially by type of claim. 
Of the six lawsuits including CEQA claims, three settled and defendants won once. 
Of the five lawsuits including non-CEQA claims, three settled and defendants won 
one. 
CEQA and non-CEQA claims were approximately equally likely to be 
raised by plaintiffs in the lawsuits. Of the seven lawsuits, six raised CEQA claims, 
but four of those six also raised planning and zoning claims. One lawsuit also raised 
planning and zoning related claims but did not raise CEQA claims. This means that 
six projects raised CEQA claims, five projects raised non-CEQA claims, two 
lawsuits raised CEQA claims only, and one lawsuit raised non-CEQA claims. 
There are two potential explanations for this. Once a plaintiff decides to sue a 
project based on planning and zoning violations, the marginal cost of adding an 
additional CEQA claim is likely not prohibitive. But the reverse is also true—the 
marginal cost of adding a planning and zoning claim to a CEQA suit is likely not 
great either. Regardless, non-CEQA claims (for example, that project approvals 
violated state or local zoning or planning codes) appear to be just as common as 
CEQA claims. This suggests that CEQA is not the only driver of litigation in this 
context. It also suggests that eliminating CEQA might not eliminate legal 
challenges to most of the projects that were litigated during this study period in 
these cities.319  
 
 
 
 
317. The lawsuit against Habitat for Humanity in Redwood City is illustrative. Two 
attorneys filed suit against an approved affordable housing development, alleging that the 
height of the building would block sunlight in their office windows. The project was only 
half of the allowable height in the Downtown Precise Plan area. The lawsuit eventually 
settled. See Press Release, Holland & Knight, Holland & Knight Achieves Favorable 
Settlement for Habitat for Humanity in Legal Battle over Proposed Affordable Housing 
Development (July 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZST9-UG3B; See also Zachary Carr, 
Settlement reached over height of downtown affordable housing, THE DAILY J. (Jul. 21, 
2018) https://perma.cc/UUD8-W9X3.  
318. We note that given the small sample size of our litigation data set (seven 
lawsuits), any conclusions we draw about the nature and resolution of litigation will be 
limited. We expect to draw firmer conclusions after collecting additional litigation data from 
the Los Angeles area. 
319. One caveat to this conclusion is that different levels of judicial scrutiny to 
different kinds of claims may mean that non-CEQA land use lawsuits may be less (or more) 
likely to succeed in court than CEQA lawsuits. If this is the case, then eliminating one kind 
of lawsuit may have some impact on litigation outcomes and impacts on development. 
Again, our limited data set from the Bay Area does not allow us to draw firm conclusions 
on this point, but we will gather more data on this from the Los Angeles area. 
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Figure 21: Types of Legal Claims 
 
Lawsuits with CEQA claims 6 
Lawsuits with non-CEQA claims* 4 
Projects that raised only CEQA claims 2 
Projects that raised only non-CEQA claims* 1 
*non-CEQA claims include procedural violations or violations 
of planning and zoning law. 
 
J. Administrative appeal rates are much higher than CEQA 
litigation rates within these five cities 
 
We recognize that litigation rates do not tell the entire story of the threat 
of litigation and how it impacts the residential development process. CEQA critics 
have discussed how the threat of litigation may deter developers from even filing 
entitlement applications; this threat can also lead developers to capitulate to a 
plaintiff’s demands even before a lawsuit is filed. While it is difficult to empirically 
measure the threat of CEQA litigation given existing datasets, project 
administrative appeals provide a useful proxy in several ways. First, under state 
law a project appeal is a prerequisite to filing a CEQA lawsuit, since a plaintiff 
must first exhaust administrative remedies.320 Second, a project appeal can provide 
a potential plaintiff with a hook to leverage settlement before filing suit.  
We found that appeals rates in Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose are 
significantly higher than the litigation rates across all three of these jurisdictions 
for these study years. Notably, the appeals rates also more closely approximate our 
interview participants’ estimations of the frequency of CEQA litigation—however, 
in some cases, interview estimations were still significantly higher. When adjusting 
for appeals as a percentage of total units entitled, the appeals rate increases in every 
jurisdiction, showing that larger-than-average projects are being challenged. One 
potential explanation for the higher rate of appeals is that projects expend 
significant resources in making projects “bulletproof” in anticipation of future 
litigation. The lower litigation rates might reflect the fruit of those labors, with the 
higher appeals rates proxying for the threat of that litigation. 
The success rates for administrative appeals are more difficult to 
determine than litigation, due to the limitations in how certain jurisdictions track 
appeals in the meeting minutes for their appellate bodies. From the high appeals 
rates relative to litigation rates, it can be inferred that developers are settling with 
potential plaintiffs before a lawsuit is filed. An alternative explanation is that if 
appeals usually fail, that failure may discourage some plaintiffs from filing 
lawsuits. Further data on how these appeals are resolved will help distinguish 
between these possibilities. We will be collecting that data in our future research, 
as well as data on the types of claims raised in appeals. 
 
 
320. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21177 (2016).  
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Figure 22: Appealed Projects Per Jurisdiction  
 
 
Part IV: Discussion 
 
Our findings reveal that all the jurisdictions studied provided for dense 
infill development but retained discretionary control over new residential 
developments of five or more units, primarily through aesthetic control. All five 
cities required a similar number of approvals. Despite these similarities, the local 
processes yielded widely different results in rates of entitlements, length of 
approval periods, and implications for equity. These findings are both consistent 
and in conflict with past research and leave open important questions for future 
exploration. They also directly inform current political and policy debates.322  
 
A. In these cities, time lags in entitlement (and associated 
costs) are most likely driven by local factors and not 
CEQA or its requirements 
CEQA reform continues to hold the attention of politicians and 
policymakers.323 Data collected from these five cities (some of the most expensive 
cities in the state) suggests that reforming CEQA does little to address time lags in 
entitlement (and associated costs) within these cities, primarily because the time 
lag variations across cities does not appear to be driven by CEQA or its 
 
321. We were not able to obtain Palo Alto appeals data at the time of publication. 
322. In these conclusions, we emphasize that we will continue to collect data from 
cities around the state. We limit our conclusions to these five cities and will present 
comparative analysis across the Bay Area and Los Angeles in future work. 
323. Most recently in the 2018 Gubernatorial debate, the Republican candidate (with 
experience developing housing in the Midwest) attributed the high costs of housing to the 
law “for slowing project approvals and adding to costs of development” but focused his 
attention on “overhauling” CEQA as a potential solution to California’s persistent housing 
crisis, noting that the power that cities and counties currently have over land development 
“is appropriate.” See Liam Dillon, Newsom, Cox split on how California governments 
should respond to the housing affordability crisis, L.A. TIMES, (Oct. 8, 2018), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-may-2018-newsom-
cox-split-on-how-california-1539020247-htmlstory.html.  
Project 
Characteristics 
San 
Jose 
San 
Francisco Oakland 
Palo 
Alto321 
Redwood 
City 
# Projects 65 93 93 5 13 
# Appealed Projects 6 15 13 -- 2 
% of total projects 9% 16% 14% -- 15% 
# Units 11,463 9,768 8,958 277 1,100 
# Appealed Units 1,631 2,996 1,941 -- 493 
% of total units 14% 31% 22% -- 45% 
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requirements. First, data indicates these cities often employ tools to facilitate 
CEQA compliance, and that neither entitlement timelines nor production appears 
to coincide with the type of land-use approval processes or environmental review 
employed. For example, an exempt project in San Francisco takes twice as long as 
in Oakland, and nearly as long as a full EIR in San Jose. Thus, local practices and 
context (such as staffing levels, political dynamics and leadership, or planning 
department practices that respond to political dynamics and directives), appear to 
more strongly influence environmental review and entitlement timelines, rather 
than CEQA requirements.324 
Based on our initial findings, a better focus for the state to improve 
housing production and reduce delay in approval processes would be changing the 
local regulatory systems that cities develop for land-use approvals. This might 
include altering the processes or discretion of local governments to structure and 
administer local land-use review processes, changing the political and fiscal 
incentives around housing approval by local governments, and providing stronger 
and more enforceable legal obligations against cities to use their land use approval 
processes to facilitate housing entitlements.325 
Second, it is unclear whether CEQA reform would address the impact of 
litigation on the housing entitlement process. Some of our interview participants 
discussed the necessity of “bullet-proof EIRs”326 to forestall CEQA litigation from 
neighborhood groups. Nonetheless, we have not observed many of these project-
level EIRs in the five cities, which suggests that variations in entitlement process 
timelines between these five cities may not be easily attributable to neighborhood 
groups abusing state regulation in response to proposed project characteristics. 
While op-eds, research, and reform proposals often focus on EIRs and CEQA 
litigation,327 the data from these five cities indicates that some of the largest 
projects, those most likely to have significant environmental impacts, do not 
 
324. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Beyond the Double-Veto: Land Use Plans as 
Preemptive Intergovernmental Contracts 9 (Draft Oct. 10, 2018) (“the actual intensity of 
regulation is a function not just of the rules that exist on paper but of the interest groups that 
have organized to enforce them, and the attitudes and priorities of the local officials who 
implement them.”). 
325. In this last category, we particularly have in mind continuing efforts to strengthen 
the obligations of local governments under state law to provide Housing Elements in their 
general plans that facilitate issuance of housing entitlements. Here the state legislature could 
build on its efforts in the housing package it enacted in 2017. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 
65400, 65883.2, 65884.09; see also Elmendorf, supra note 324, at 41-8. 
326. This refers to our interpretation of statements from interview participants, 
describing the need for an EIR document that has sufficient analysis of environmental 
impacts and technical information to withstand judicial review should the project be 
challenged in court in terms similar to the term “bullet-proof” used by Barbour & Michael 
Teitz, supra note 63, at 15. 
327. Hernandez, Friedman & DeHerrera, supra note 219, at 8; Jennifer Hernandez, 
California Environmental Quality Act Lawsuits and California’s Housing Crisis, 24 
HASTINGS ENVTL. L. J. 21, 23 (2018), https://perma.cc/J7GV-TB48; see also supra note 11.  
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require EIRs (although EIR projects are on average larger than non-EIR projects), 
and that CEQA litigation is infrequent.328 
Finally, comparing our findings to the HCD Landis Report reinforces our 
conclusion that targeting CEQA may not achieve intended policy goals—at least 
not in these cities—and shows the importance of the increase in discretionary 
review as a potential driver of timeframes. Landis found a lower overall instance 
of EIRs in California—about 4% of multi-family developments or 9% of single-
family home developments. Our EIR rate is comparatively higher, with around 
10% of all projects across all jurisdictions. Our average approval times are also 
notably longer at 25 months across all cities (with a range of 10 to 34), versus the 
11 months for a single-family and 6.7 months for multi-family developments in the 
Landis study. However, the use of project-based tiering is dissimilar from the rate 
of 26% in the Landis study; we found a rate of 55% in our project years. Notably, 
the number of approvals per project is also distinguishable. The Landis study found 
2.8 approvals per project on average while our research shows 3.6 on average. Our 
data suggests that despite more frequent streamlined CEQA review, overall 
approval time frames within certain cities are increasing as numbers of approvals 
per project increase. This further illustrates the inability of state CEQA reform to 
address the issue of time lags in entitlement processes. The local land use 
regulatory process in general—and the imposition of discretionary review by local 
governments in particular—is therefore a key issue for policymakers and 
researchers to consider.  
B. Variability and uncertainty in the entitlement process 
across these jurisdictions may be a more critical factor 
influencing entitlement timelines than stringency 
 
Our findings generally conform to national surveys like Pendall and 
WRLURI. These five cities are highly regulated coastal communities that have 
permissive density, high (and similar) numbers of approvals, and affordable 
housing incentives. Our findings are also somewhat consistent with the BLURI, in 
that the BLURI found that the timeframe to complete “permit-review” was about 
2 years for multi-family housing and 2.5 years for single-family housing.329 We 
found a 25-month review period on average in our jurisdictions across all project 
types, which is roughly consistent with BLURI’s findings, provided their 
 
328. However, we again note the limitations of our current data which can only 
assess to a limited extent how important the threat of litigation is to whether projects are 
proposed and how projects are modified in the approval process. We hope to further 
investigate those questions once we gather additional data on litigation and administrative 
appeal data from across the state. In particular, one question is whether projects go through 
EIRs not because of higher environmental risk, but because of higher political risk. Projects 
that face significant community opposition require EIRs because of the nature of the 
entitlement process that political opposition creates. Those projects in turn are therefore 
more likely to be litigated. Again, with additional data from more projects, we hope to 
explore this question. 
329. Quigley, Raphael & Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 289. 
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timeframes do not include the issuance of building permits,330 but again, we found 
that the range is great (10 to 34 months). We also found, similar to the Pendall 
study, that aesthetic controls can be an important factor in the number of units 
entitled. 
However, these are general consistencies that say little about how local 
regulation, discretionary review, or local process operates. BLURI found that 
larger cities have more required approvals, which is not entirely supported by our 
data, as smaller cities like Palo Alto, Redwood City, and Oakland required more 
approvals than San Francisco and San Jose, which are larger in size.331 Also, 
although four of the five cities use aesthetic controls (considered subjective)332 as 
the primary mechanism for discretionary review, while also providing for density 
within the base zoning, and all cities required approximately the same number of 
approvals, Oakland and Redwood City had comparatively shorter entitlement 
timelines.333 This tells us that stringency, if defined by the type and number of 
discretionary approvals, appears to operate in Redwood City and Oakland in very 
different ways than in neighboring cities. This also cautions against generalizing 
state-level policy reform proposals from how land use processes operate within a 
single city, or even a single region.334  
In addition, the variation in entitlement processes across these 
jurisdictions may factor into constraining supply or increasing costs. This variation 
appears to present informational barriers for newcomers to the market—even for 
some working within the same region. Variation may impede a developer from 
navigating the development process within each of these cities without substantial 
local knowledge. This complexity and variation could also impact the capacity of 
planning staff to help developers understand the entitlement process. Our interview 
data confirms that well-capitalized developers with existing relationships and 
experience in specific jurisdictions are the best situated to navigate these complex 
local contexts, giving them a competitive advantage. Also, project-level data 
indicates that larger projects do not necessarily take more time, but often take less 
time, than smaller projects. If the complexity and requirements of environmental 
review were the issue, this is not intuitive. This suggests that larger market-rate 
projects—to the extent that they benefit from expertise and better capitalization—
can navigate the processes in these cities in less time than smaller-scale 
developments. This raises concerns about monopolization, as the cost of acquiring 
local knowledge forces new market participants out, which could also contribute 
 
330. The BLURI is unclear about whether it is measuring the entire development 
process from entitlement application to building permit issuance or just the process to obtain 
a land use entitlement. Depending on how the survey was itself phrased, the vague 
terminology might have also influenced participants’ responses. If the BLURI is including 
building permit issuance, our timeframes would be much longer. 
331. Id. at 282. Note that BLURI might have been measuring approvals to obtain a 
building permit, which might also skew this response. 
332. See Blaesser, supra note 36, at xix. 
333. Oakland and Redwood City also had median timelines on certain size projects 
that were also closer to the 6 months average. 
334. This last point emphasizes the importance of collecting additional data from Los 
Angeles and other areas in California, which we are in the process of collecting. 
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to increased housing costs. The difficulty in accessing this data for our research 
purposes also supports this proposition.  
A second related issue is the lack of predictability in the process within 
specific cities. Interviews suggest that unpredictability, as opposed to stringency, 
in process imposes costs that may keep developers from advancing a project. As 
discussed in Part III, Redwood City successfully mitigated this unpredictability 
issue by its Downtown Precise Plan, which imposes more prescriptive 
development requirements to help with certainty and reduced timeframes. 
Although prescriptive design requirements have drawbacks,335 if a jurisdiction is 
going to impose aesthetic review, explicit design standards can reduce the inherent 
subjectivity of aesthetic review.336 As project-level data across all five cities 
demonstrates, Redwood City moves comparatively quicker, although all five cities 
have stringent local ordinances. This suggests that Redwood City’s approach, 
which maintains local discretion and a high number of approvals (compared to 
national averages), could potentially reduce approval timeframes and increase 
production yields.337 
Redwood City therefore provides a compelling case study of how to 
incorporate improvements in discretionary processes in the planning of a new, 
dense transit-oriented neighborhood, and how to maintain discretionary review and 
stringency while also expediting entitlement processes. San Francisco, on the other 
hand, illustrates how the benefits of specific planning tools that promote infill 
development might be significantly outweighed by the costs of a protracted 
approval process. This approval process appears related to either San Francisco’s 
unique charter provision (that renders even building permits discretionary actions) 
or a political culture that influences (and slows) planning practices.  
 
335. Interview participants have noted that highly prescriptive design standards 
generally give architects less ability to maneuver around building form. They can also have 
cost impacts if the regulations prescribe more expensive materials, more open space, or a 
more expensive construction type. 
336. See e.g., Lemar, supra note 218, at 1563 (noting that “whether a building is 
visually appealing is a subjective inquiry. Whether a building is consistent with the existing 
architectural context is a supposedly objective one) (emphasis added); Brian Soucek, 
Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. R. 382, 417 (2017) (noting that aesthetic judgment 
in land use regulation extends beyond the question of “what types of buildings or uses of 
land are the prettiest” to judgments about an area’s identity and social cohesion). 
337. Litigation is another potential source of uncertainty for entitlement processes 
that can increase costs. However, at least in our current data, litigation occurs at relatively 
low rates, while all projects go through ambiguous and uncertain design review. Thus, at 
least initially it appears to us that providing certainty in the design review process is more 
important for improving the entitlement process than reducing litigation (again with the 
caveat identified in note 311, supra, about the threat of litigation). This is the approach taken 
by the state legislature when it enacted SB 35, which eliminates much discretionary review 
for certain qualifying affordable housing developments in cities that have not met their 
housing goals. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65400 (West 2018). 
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C. Uneven land use regulation across a city may operate as a 
tool of exclusion 
Lens and Monkkonen’s research indicates that stringency in land use 
regulation correlates with income segregation, but that this correlation still exists 
in jurisdictions with permissive density.338 This suggests that other land use 
controls, beyond base zoning, contribute to income segregation. Our findings may 
contribute to an understanding of what may be occurring—at least within these five 
cities.  
As discussed in Part III,339 all these cities move affordable housing 
development through entitlement much faster than market rate development. None 
of the 100% affordable housing developments within our data set were the subject 
of litigation. This suggests that entitlement processes (in terms of timelines) and 
environmental review (in terms of opportunity for legal challenge) were likely not 
the constraint on affordable housing supply during these three years. We 
emphasize, however, that because these cities approved so few 100% affordable 
housing developments within our dataset years, it is difficult to ascertain too much 
about timelines. Moreover, it is possible that opposition to affordable housing 
might shift if these cities approved substantially more 100% affordable housing 
developments or approved them in different areas. 
Planning and zoning analysis indicates that four of our five cities provide 
for permissive density and employ tools to incentivize dense residential 
development near transit, but that permissive density and incentives for growth are 
not evenly distributed in these same cities.340 This can create a scarcity issue (in 
terms of appropriately zoned land within cities) even though these same cities 
presumably have permissive density. Interview data suggests that the increasing 
cost of appropriately zoned land presents a major obstacle to affordable housing 
supply. This combined with drastic reductions in financing available for affordable 
housing impacts production, because combined, they create fewer opportunities for 
affordable housing development within these cities. Study participants across all 
categories repeatedly emphasized that legislative efforts must target both issues, as 
they operate together to limit deed-restricted affordable development, particularly 
after the loss of redevelopment funds.  
Project data also confirmed that very few affordable units were entitled in 
our study years across all cities. San Francisco had the highest rate of affordable 
units entitled, at 11%, which came primarily through its inclusionary ordinance 
(outside of the former Redevelopment Areas). The lack of financing and suitable 
zoning for affordable housing developments, along with the importance of 
affordable housing mandates on market-rate developments in producing affordable 
units, lends some support to Lens and Monkkonen’s recommendation for 
inclusionary zoning.341 Still, inclusionary housing is insufficient to solve the 
 
338. See Lens and Monkkonen, supra note 129. 
339. See supra Part III.7. 
340. See supra Part III.8. 
341. See Lens and Monkkonen, supra note 129, at 12. 
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affordable housing crisis for all segments of the population. The formerly 
homeless, for example, require service-enriched housing,342 as do other special 
needs populations.343 Inclusionary housing aside, the fact that San Francisco had 
essentially no development of 5 or more units outside of specific plan areas and 
former Redevelopment Areas indicates inadequately zoned land may be a barrier 
to future dense development, both for affordable and market-rate. 
D. More data is needed about the risk of displacement 
through new development 
Supply-side solutions have been proposed repeatedly in both the 
academic and policy literature, as well as proposed legal reforms, with some 
research identifying potential displacement as an immediate and direct consequent 
of development. This poses difficult questions for policymakers at both the local 
and state level on how to promote dense infill development without displacing 
existing residents, and whether or how local or state proposals are avoiding a 
tradeoff of displacement for increased future supply.344 Most of the proposed 
development in these five cities was on vacant, commercial or industrial land, 
except San Jose which had one entitled project involving the demolition of a 216 
unit rent-controlled building subject to rent stabilization. However, these findings 
are limited. We only observed five cities in a region, and not all these cities had 
rent stabilization ordinances. More data across high cost cities with minimal vacant 
land, particularly those with rent stabilization ordinances, is needed to evaluate the 
potential impact of any proposed policy that may implicate this issue.  
E. State-level reform proposals that would reduce local 
authority require better data 
In these five cities, legal reform to promote equitable infill development 
may come in the form of state legislative reductions in local discretion over specific 
types of development; alternatively, legal reform may originate in the electorate or 
city council of these cities by choosing to reduce the amount of discretionary 
review for development. State-level action is difficult; there have been successful 
efforts to reduce local discretion,345 but two major recent proposals for by-right or 
 
342. See e.g., Kevin Fagan, Solution to SF’s homeless problem starts with supportive 
housing, S.F. CHRONICLE (June 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/9EFH-J4U2.  
343. The California Tax Credit Allocation Committee defines these special needs 
populations as “[i]ndividuals living with physical or sensory disabilities and transitioning from 
hospitals, nursing homes, development centers, or other care facilities; individuals living with 
developmental or mental health disabilities; individuals who are survivors of physical abuse; 
individuals who are homeless . . . ; individuals with chronic illness, including HIV; homeless 
youth . . . .” See 4 C.C.R. § 10325(g)(3) https://perma.cc/J3R4-9SWP. 
344. See e.g., Zuk and Chapple, supra note 208. 
345. See S.B. 35, 2017 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
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limited by-right development have failed.346 While our case studies suggest that 
some political will to increase affordable housing supply exists in at minimum four 
of these cities, it is unclear how broad that impulse extends across the state or how 
strong it may be. 
Assuming a new proposal limiting local discretion over infill 
development with affordability is politically feasible, the variation in local 
processes observed in these five cities in a single region is substantial enough that 
without good data across multiple cities and regions, there is a high risk that state-
level reform of local process may not advance intended policy goals.  
For example, recent legislation such as SB-35347 attempts to eliminate the 
CUP requirement for certain projects consistent with zoning, but the complexity of 
the entitlement processes may prevent this legislation from accomplishing what is 
needed in these five cities. For instance, some cities impose a myriad of specific 
plan approvals on zoning-compliant projects that happen to be located within a 
specific plan area.348 Although these approvals are functionally similar to CUPs, 
on paper they are different processes. HCD has drafted proposed regulations that 
appear to cover specific plan permits within the ministerial process.349 San Jose 
provides another example. Most projects in San Jose go through the PUD process, 
which requires rezoning and thus renders a project ineligible for SB-35. Yet the 
same PUD process in San Francisco and Oakland can occur without rezoning. Even 
though the PUD process accomplishes the same goals in these jurisdictions, the 
application is significantly different. Without knowledge of these nuances, 
lawmakers cannot draft legislation that accurately addresses the problem and 
provides clear guidance to local stakeholders. Moreover, without an understanding 
of the distribution of non-zoning compliant projects entitled each year, lawmakers 
may find their legislative tools unable to solve the right problems. Even legislation 
that is effective when enacted may quickly become ineffective due to local 
government efforts to restore control over new development. For instance, SB-35 
may be unable to avoid cities downzoning or enacting more inflexible design 
criteria to force all approvals through rezoning or variance processes that are not 
subject to state streamlining. SB 166—California’s “no net loss” law—prohibits 
jurisdictions from reducing residential density to a lower residential density than 
what was utilized to determine compliance with housing element law.350 While this 
helps mitigate unintended impacts of SB-35, it is unclear if the provision applies 
 
346. See CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., STREAMLINING AFFORDABLE HOUSING APPROVALS: 
TRAILER BILL TECHNICAL MODIFICATIONS (6-10-16) (2016), https://perma.cc/GDS6-XVCR, 
at 5–6; S.B. 827 Reg. Leg. Sess. (2017-2018) (Cal. 2018). 
347. See S.B. 35, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
348. Examples of this include the Large Project Authorization in certain use districts 
of San Francisco’s Eastern Neighborhood plan area or the Planned Community Permit in 
Redwood City’s Downtown Precise Plan. See S.F. MUNI. CODE § 329; REDWOOD CITY 
MUNI. CODE § 47.1-47. 5.  
349. See Memorandum from Cal. Dep’t. Housing & Community Dev., Draft SB-35 
Regulations § 301(a), Sept. 28, 2018, https://perma.cc/J5U7-KDKN (defining the 
ministerial process as “non-discretionary and cannot require a conditional use permit or 
other discretionary local government review or approval”).  
350. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65863 (2018).  
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to charter cities.351 Moreover, SB-35 may be ineffective in jurisdictions where base 
zoning has not been updated to reflect General Plan updates.352 Finally, 
jurisdictions are increasingly regulating density based on height and building form. 
In many places, height—not a limit on dwelling units per acre or FAR—is the 
major barrier to building more units. Future state legislation should consider these 
evolving zoning standards.353  
F. The state should not only mandate, but directly support 
good data reporting 
 
Perhaps the single most important finding explored in this article is also 
the most obvious—poor data access to project approvals in many jurisdictions. 
Results are only accurate to the extent that data provided to the public through 
public portals and commission minutes are accurate. While better-resourced 
jurisdictions have advanced parcel information tools and sophisticated websites, 
many rely on outdated online permit systems that are not updated with current data. 
Oakland is an extreme example of what can result from inadequate resources—
their online permit system often contains incomplete information and has no link 
to approval documents. While we supplemented these shortfalls with minutes from 
Planning Commission and City Council meetings, some projects go through an 
administrative, department-level review for which complete data was not available. 
While we erred on the side of caution and included six projects in our database that 
do not have complete data, we caution that it is possible that these six projects skew 
the total number of approved projects higher than what it actually is. Additionally, 
Oakland’s pre-application process that some projects utilize prior to submitting a 
formal application was also inconsistently logged in their online system, which 
could influence approval timelines. We cannot infer that Oakland’s poor data 
access is either deliberate or a reflection of local policy; the city’s continued work 
to supplement state requirements around open government suggests the 
opposite.354 It is more likely that Oakland, which faces a uniquely persistent budget 
 
351. Section 65803 exempts charter cities from compliance with §§ 65800 – 65912 
of the Planning and Land Use Code unless explicitly stated otherwise. The text of SB 166 
does not explicitly apply its requirements to charter cities. All of the jurisdictions studied 
are charter cities. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65803 (2018). For a legal interpretation that the 
new requirements do apply to charter cities, see Public Interest Law Project, SB 166 (2017) 
Memorandum at 6, https://perma.cc/TK7V-AMYD. Without an amendment to the 
Government Code, determining applicability will likely require litigation.  
352. See discussion of San Jose, supra Part I n.33. 
353. We note that SB 827, which failed, attempted to do this. See S.B. 827, 2017-
2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (the proposed legislation exempted eligible applicants 
from certain height requirements). 
354. In 1997 Oakland passed its own Sunshine Ordinance to supplement Brown Act 
requirements around open government, developed in partnership with the League of Women 
Voters and the California First Amendment Coalition. This ordinance covers meeting 
minutes and agendas relevant to discretionary approvals of residential development. See 
OAKLAND MUNI. CODE §§ 2.20.010 et seq. (Oakland Sunshine Ordinance).  
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crisis,355 is severely under-resourced given city initiatives to accelerate 
development and the growing demand for housing. 
In contrast, cities like San Francisco have excellent data access that allows 
us to determine precisely what was approved each year according to our 
parameters. However, even good publicly accessible data does not fully reflect the 
complexity of the planning process. San Francisco employs a streamlined 
application process356 that integrates processes that constitute distinct approval 
pathways in other jurisdictions, like design review. The fact that there are no formal 
design review approvals in San Francisco does not mean these processes are not 
happening. San Francisco’s various specific plan permits also combine what is 
essentially a CUP and variance process into one, reducing the number of CUPs and 
variances in that jurisdiction. More projects are receiving variances than these 
numbers suggest. Jurisdictions like San Jose, on the other hand, employ very 
distinct approval processes, which also influences timeline. The majority of 
developments in San Jose go through the PUD process, which involves a rezoning 
and a permit approval that happen sequentially, rather than in tandem. Our 
interviews suggest that developers often complete the rezoning and then sell the 
land to different developers who later secure the permit. The time lag between these 
two milestones may slightly exaggerate approval timelines in San Jose for PUD 
projects. 
Although top-down state reform of environmental regulations (or local 
regulation over land use) may encounter substantial difficulties, improving data 
access is an important first step to accurately understand the problem. Extracting 
project-level data is very time and resource intensive. There are few jurisdictions 
statewide that have development approval data in one centralized repository. 
Supporting jurisdictions to provide access to project-specific data on land use 
approvals, CEQA compliance, and overall time frames will help inform top down 
policy making in critical ways. Improving the quality of data and access to data 
can also help researchers and policymakers identify how long processes take and 
identify inefficiencies and redundancies that exist in local processes. This could 
also immediately help affordable housing developers determine what funding is 
required for the entitlement process. Finally, publicly available data about approval 
timeframes and processes may increase public and political pressure on local 
governments to make processes more effective and efficient. 
SB 35 has somewhat advanced this issue some, in that it requires annual 
data reporting (which includes reporting total number applications received, 
projects entitled, building permits issued, and total number of certificates of 
occupancy issued).357 The state could build on this requirement to support this 
 
355. See Daniel Borenstein, Despite booming economy, Oakland finances 
deteriorate, THE MERCURY NEWS (March 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/8MT4-7X3P.  
356. In early 2018, San Francisco overhauled its entitlement application process. 
While this new process would likely impact data collection for projects applying for 
entitlements post-2018, this new process does not affect our data years. CITY AND COUNTY 
OF SAN FRANCISCO, CHANGES TO PRELIMINARY PROJECT ASSESSMENT, Apr. 2, 2018, 
https://pe rma.cc/AEE5-LD4T.  
357. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65400 (2018); see also Elmendorf, supra note 324, at 47. 
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work through two additional mechanisms. The first would be funding to support 
existing data reporting requirements (including those proposed here). As discussed 
previously, not all jurisdictions are equally resourced, and this appears to have a 
significant impact on the quality of a city’s data. We anticipate that without 
additional support, at least some city reports will be unreliable. The second would 
be an enhanced housing element reporting obligation that requires jurisdictions to 
log information on approval processes and timeframes in a centralized repository 
with consistent terminology across jurisdictions. To the extent that processes are 
so dissimilar that they cannot be analogized, this centralized repository could 
contain explanations. This will aid not only in understanding entitlement processes, 
but will also help legal organizations to enforce housing element obligations. 
Housing issues present regional concerns, and current data accessibility and quality 
presents obstacles to comparative and regional analysis on both trends (rate of 
entitlement), and processes (which processes may work better). 
Smaller steps would also be beneficial. For example, linking existing GIS 
or zoning data with assessor parcel information and building permit systems is a 
great first step to understanding how entitlements and building permit processes 
interact. Linking these systems to provide this data can make housing element 
reporting obligations more robust. Ideally, improved data access can illuminate 
more of the internal planning process, by providing detail that is not immediately 
apparent from approval documents (like the amount of time environmental review 
adds to the approval process). Interview data suggests that improved entitlement 
reporting and data can particularly benefit affordable housing developers. 
Financing affordable housing requires artful layering of state, local, and federal 
finance—each with their own set of eligibility requirements.358 Funding 
applications also happen in cycles. For example, in California, the 9% Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit has two funding rounds per year.359 For most of these 
programs, the site must already be entitled in order to be eligible for funding.360 
Thus, timing entitlements with the funding cycles is very important to affordable 
housing developers. In an era of limited funding, timing the cycle correctly maybe 
the difference between a project being funded or not. Improved data can assist 
developers to improve their predevelopment strategy, especially in areas where 
they have less experience developing. As discussed above, we observed that these 
jurisdictions appear to process affordable housing faster than market rate housing. 
 
358. See e.g., Affordable Housing and Sustainable Communities Program, CAL. 
DEP’T OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEV. (last visited Oct. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/ 
TBV2-E759; Low Income Tax Credit Programs, CAL. TAX CREDIT ALLOCATION COMM. 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/C6NE-7N2Q; See also Affordable Housing 
Trust Fund, CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND CMTY. INV. DEP’T. (last visited Oct. 26, 2018), https: 
//perma.cc/99KB-SK5S.  
359. See e.g., Application Information, CAL. TAX CREDIT ALLOCATION COMM. (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/D8CS-8S7H (detailing deadlines for two funding 
rounds). 
360. See e.g., 4 C.C.R. § 10325(f)(4) (2018) (“Applicants shall provide evidence, at 
the time the application is filed, that the project as proposed is zoned for the intended use 
and has obtained all applicable local land use approvals which allow the discretion of local 
elected officials to be applied . . .”). 
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From this, we can infer that some jurisdictions treat affordable housing differently, 
and nuances in process should be made publicly available. This is especially true 
in jurisdictions where affordable housing entitlement is slower than comparable 
market-rate development. 
Conclusion: Complex issues require a multi-pronged research 
approach 
Our work continues and we are exploring how entitlement operates within 
other cities throughout the state. At each turn we are reminded there is no single 
solution to this perplexing problem. Even within land use regulation, entitlement 
is not the only issue for housing production in California. Increasingly onerous 
building safety regulations—ranging from seismic standards to renewable energy 
mandates—may also impose substantial costs on development. The building 
permit process itself is highly variable by jurisdiction, and interviews suggest it is 
another source of time delay. Interview participants also referenced construction 
and labor costs as a major barrier to feasibility. Labor costs, however, do not stem 
solely from Project Labor Agreements361 or prevailing wage requirements;362 
developers have also noted a drop in skilled tradespeople post-Great Recession, 
which has created labor scarcity and implicates workforce development issues. 
Further study on these factors is necessary. More information is also required on 
the demand side of the equation—specifically how income and preferences 
influence where people live and whether they use transit. In sum, we need a better 
understanding of both sides of the equation (supply and demand), with a clear focus 
on equity in order to reduce GHG emissions through equitable infill development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
361. Project Labor Agreements are collective bargaining agreements between 
building trade unions and contractors that govern terms and conditions of employment for 
all workers on a construction project. See Project Labor Agreements, AFL-CIO, (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/C8VX-UC8G. 
362. See, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE § 65913.4(a)(1)-(10) (2004) (defining prevailing 
wage to be the “general prevailing rate of per diem wages for the type of work and 
geographic area, as determined by the Director of Industrial Relations pursuant to Sections 
1773 and 1773.9 of the Labor Code”). 
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